from Book One

Source Text

In the Eye of the Storm

A Memoir

Kurt Waldheim

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

Published in the United States in 1986 by
Adler & Adler, Publishers, Inc.
4550 Montgomery Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland 20814

Originally published in Great Britain by
George Weidenfeld & Nicolson Limited
91 Clapham High Street
London SW4 7TA

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Waldheim, Kurt.
In the eye of the storm.

1. Waldheim, Kurt. 2. United Nations. Secretary
General—Biography. 3. Statesmen—Austria—Biography.
4. World politics—1975–1985. I. Title
D839.7.W34A34 1986 341.23.'24 [B] 85–14215
ISBN 0–917561–08–2

Printed in the United States of America

First U.S. Edition

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major crisis area of the continent. I have no doubt that their policy of racial discrimination will one day collapse. The white man has long realized, despite his fear of annihilation, that he cannot do away with his black compatriots. The black population has long been aware that the white man is not a colonialist in South Africa but has the right to live there. A genuine dialogue is crucial, and both sides must recognize that they need each other. I hope it is not too late for the necessary revolution of the spirit.

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The New Majority

During the whole of the seventies, when I was Secretary General, world attention focused mainly on wars, conflicts and international crises and on how these were dealt with by the United Nations. Unfortunately this led to a misconception about the work of the world organization. Since the attitudes of the member governments very often did not permit the UN to discharge its duties as foreseen in the Charter, the image of the United Nations deteriorated. Although I fully recognize the importance of the political role of the organization, during my term of office I was faced with a new challenge, the handling of a new phenomenon, namely the growing gap between the rich countries in the North and the poor countries in the South of the globe.

In a world which had not really taken note of the historic dimension of this dramatic awakening in the Third World, the United Nations was the one single place where these forces could express themselves and mobilize the community of nations to draw attention to their plight.

The influx of newly independent countries radically altered the entire character of the United Nations. This massive group of Third World nations was not beholden to the West; it was encouraged, but not controlled, by the Soviet bloc. Its leaders proved highly adept at establishing operational groupings within the organization. In addition to continental and regional groups, they formed two over-arching organizations that included the vast majority of United Nations membership. In the political sphere, the Non-Aligned Movement was designed to function as a third force which could remain aloof from East-West alliances and manoeuvres. Their founding fathers were Tito, Nehru and Nasser, together with the Indonesian President Sukarno. A parallel organization, the 'Group of 77' (actually, now over 125 states), was set up in order to advance the economic and social development of its membership. Each of these groups met periodically to concert strategy and tactics. Their

cohesion has remained remarkable, in spite of the fact that they include a number of oil-rich developing countries. This has failed to disturb their common front.

These overlapping coalitions now include virtually all the non-white, non-Western states in Asia and Africa, the bulk of the countries in South America and even a few Soviet allies such as Cuba, Vietnam and the Mongolian People's Republic. They have transformed the parliamentary structure of the United Nations. Bloc politics tends to dominate decision-making. The new majority of the Third World overwhelms the out-numbered West. East-West rivalries, while still predominant in global terms, have become relatively less prominent in United Nations affairs.

The goals of these new members are egalitarian. The bulk of the wealth, scientific and technological skills, educational talent and productive capacity in the world is concentrated in a relatively few states. As long as this continues, the anti-colonial revolution, in the eyes of the less developed countries, cannot be considered complete.

On their own, most of these countries could do little to make their case persuasively. But in the United Nations, where all states enjoy the same voting rights, the situation is different. By joining forces, the smaller states can, within broad limits, control most of the decisions. To be sure, the word 'decisions' is, in most cases, a misnomer. In the General Assembly there are only recommendations, without binding effect. Even so they are not to be ignored, and over the course of time are bound to influence thought and action.

In order to facilitate the development process, the General Assembly created in 1964 the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Three years later the UN Assembly established the UN Industrial Development Organization to assist the developing countries. It is now in the process of becoming a fully fledged specialized agency of the UN with its own separately funded budget.

Both the agenda and the membership of the world organization were evolving in a way not foreseen by its founding fathers. It soon became apparent that what the new Third World majority was seeking was nothing less than a revolution in the world economy, to be won less by coercion than by the power of persuasion in the international forum. They demanded fairness and justice: fairness because they did not accept that three-quarters of the world's population living in the under-developed countries should enjoy only one-fifth of its gross income; justice because, in their eyes, the old colonial powers had gained their wealth by exploiting the peoples and resources of their former possessions. To redress the balance they should now agree to a massive transfer of resources to the countries of the south.

There had indeed been examples in post-war history of such acts of enlightened self-interest as the Marshall Plan, the American Alliance for Progress, and European Community arrangements for economic assistance to their former African, Caribbean and Pacific territories under the Lomé Conventions. These programmes had one feature in common: they combined economic aid with the strengthening of alliances, or at least enhanced political affinity.

In contrast, the demands the Third World countries made on the Western industrialized states offered no comparable rewards. Their more radical leaders seldom based their claims in the context of mutual benefits. They spoke of the redressing of wrongs, and economic and social development, not as an aspiration but as a right to which they were entitled. It was an approach which produced confrontation rather than accommodation of views. The Third World could not achieve its purposes without the participation of the industrialized states they were attacking. The result of this policy in the United Nations was chronic acrimony and frustration.

One group, the bloc of Marxist states, stood largely aloof from the whole debate. The Soviet Union and its supporters, and also China, regarded development as a responsibility of the former colonial powers. They supported the argument that it was for the Western countries to compensate the developing nations for the exploitation to which they had been subjected in an earlier era. The Marxist countries hardly participated in the multilateral development activities of the UN. They preferred to pursue their own bilateral aid programmes.

Obviously, the industrialized countries were reluctant to accept blanket liability for the alleged evils of colonialism and imperialism. They were willing to make adjustments in existing institutions and practices to meet the pressing needs of the South, but the improvements they proposed were incremental rather than radical. They insisted that economic development was a complex and lengthy process. They refused to – as they put it – give money and credit, machinery, infrastructure and technical assistance to countries lacking the personnel, organization and experience to absorb them.

It must be said that they did not have to look far to find instances of the failure of ill-considered development projects, or examples of lack of co-ordination among donor agencies and waste and corruption among the recipients. The cost of major aid programmes was high. To grant trade preferences or guarantee higher prices for raw materials, or to extend financial aid on concessionary terms, involved a real cost to the industries, consumers and tax-payers of the developed countries. They preferred to rely as far as possible on market forces to increase the productive capacity

of the poorer nations.

Both personally and in terms of my constitutional position, I felt considerable sympathy for the basic position of the South. In all good conscience, nations which had subscribed to the UN Charter's pursuit of 'better standards of life in larger freedom' could not stand passively by in the face of massive poverty, hunger, ill-health and illiteracy. The disparity between the two worlds was not diminishing but to a considerable extent increasing. Remedial action was necessary, and in my judgement it could only be carried out on a world scale if the UN organization participated in a major way. The facts were incontrovertible. In the North, one-fourth of the world's population possessed more than nine-tenths of its manufacturing industry and received more than four-fifths of its income. In the South, more than 1.2 billion people lived in countries with a gross national product averaging less than $250 per head per year.

Realistically, however, the process could not be a one-way street. Whatever the help from outside, a critical factor in development would be the self-reliant effort of the countries in the south themselves.

Nothing would be accomplished if the two sides dug in on extreme positions and used the United Nations to launch verbal broadsides at each other. I therefore devoted myself to a search for areas of agreement, the advocacy of moderation and gradualism and the continuation of a dialogue between the parties.

When I assumed office the industrial world was ending a decade of exceptional growth. The UN had established an 'international development strategy' to set economic targets, and while the major industrialized nations had expressed some reservations, they had endorsed the general principle of moving by co-operation towards a more just and rational world economic and social order. The decade of the seventies was one of sharp and painful economic adjustments. The system of fixed exchange rates created by the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 had collapsed and, in 1973/4, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ended the era of cheap energy by quadrupling the price of oil. These events shook the world economic system, but their weight fell most heavily on the poorest countries, which lacked the reserves and productive resources to cope. Even the richer nations went into recession, resulting in a combination of inflation and unemployment.

The oil shock galvanized the more outspoken leaders of the Group of 77. They saw that their oil-rich brothers had wrested control of their natural resources from the multinational corporations. They had sharply reversed the adverse terms of trade from which the former colonial territories habitually suffered. The invulnerability of the North had been challenged and the other developing countries, particularly those with other market-

able assets, hoped to make comparable gains.

Under the leadership of President Houari Boumédienne of Algeria, at that time the head of the non-aligned group, they called for a special session of the General Assembly in April 1974 'with a view to establishing a new system of relations based on equality and the common interests of all states'. Boumédienne was peremptory, proclaiming the failure of the international development strategy and attributing this to the lack of political will on the part of the developed countries to take the required urgent action, and the inadequacy of the growth targets in relation to the real needs of the South.

He sustained this combative tone in the conversation we had at the outset of this sixth special session in New York. The real issue, he said, was economic domination of the poor by the rich. The Third World now had real bargaining power by virtue of their natural resources. In order to avoid confrontation, both sides should initiate a responsible dialogue. The industrialized nations would have to change their policies and demonstrate a political will to co-operate. What his group hoped for from the Assembly was nothing less than the forging of a new international economic order.

He insisted that the position of the United States would be particularly significant. I told him that I knew from my contacts in Washington that the American administration was taking a passive attitude towards the special session. For my own part I felt that the US must participate actively in the work of the session if it was to have any meaning. It would become highly undesirable for them to be isolated in the Assembly, and I persuaded them to assume a more active role. At the same time I advised Boumédienne to seek a constructive compromise.

The special session in 1974 was not to be guided by counsels of moderation. It adopted a resolution providing for fundamental changes in the entire structure of international economic relations, including provisions on commodities, trade and industrialization, natural resources, food, finance and multinational corporations. The countries of the North were not prepared to respond in depth to these far-reaching proposals. They did not vote against the resulting 'Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New Economic Order', but they made it clear through numerous reservations that they would not comply.

At the regular Assembly session the following autumn, the same adversarial spirit prevailed. This time the Group of 77 united behind a proposed 'Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States' which had been drafted by President Luis Echeverría of Mexico. This declared that every state had 'the sovereign and inalienable right' to choose its own economic, political, social and cultural systems without any outside interference and should exercise 'full permanent sovereignty' over its

wealth, natural resources and economic activities. The developing nations were to have the sole right to decide for themselves the terms for compensating expropriated foreign enterprises.

These demands brought North-South relations in the organization to a new low. Most of the larger industrialized countries resented the verbal attacks and far-reaching demands of the majority. They were unwilling to abandon the existing economic system. If additional aid was to be made available for development, the countries of the North would have to provide most of it. As oil importers they were already making a massive transfer of financial resources to the OPEC countries and they now demanded that these should share in any major programmes to assist those less developed. The session ended in disarray.

The developing countries dismissed the proposal put forward by the West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, that instead of the same old long catalogue of impossible demands they should draw up a list of the things they wanted in some order of priority so that negotiations could start. The representatives of the Third World alone rejected it as patchwork politics where radical action was needed.

Nevertheless, as the months passed, as a result of constant interchanges at the UN passions cooled and more moderate views emerged. A seventh special session of the General Assembly was held in the first half of September 1975. The contrast with its predecessor was remarkable. The developed countries, and particularly the United States, had evidently decided that a purely negative posture would help neither party. In a highlight speech the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, put forward a number of promising proposals in a spirit of reconciliation. Kissinger had begun to recognize the usefulness of the UN for Washington's foreign policies and obviously wanted to make a gesture to reduce Third World sceptism towards the United States.

He outlined a broad range of new international machinery, with offers of additional financial resources in response to the developing countries' needs in the fields of commodities, trade, finance, industrialization and food production. Others adopted a similarly conciliatory tone and an intensive effort began to reach common ground. The special session reached its conclusions by consensus and its work contributed to an improvement of economic relations between North and South.

In all candour I would have to admit that the promise of the seventh special session has not been realized in anything like the form then envisaged.

It was the merit of Henry Kissinger that the relationship between the United Nations and the Nixon administration, which had previously been

overshadowed by the controversy over Vietnam, improved progressively, although Nixon himself remained in the background. My relations with the President had been ambivalent. During my first year of office I had put out a public statement concerning the alleged American bombing of the dykes around Hanoi. I appealed on humanitarian grounds to cease operations that led to so much suffering. President Nixon had reacted in sharp tones. The Vietnam War was becoming extremely unpopular and doubtless my intervention was unwelcome, particularly in the period leading up to his second election. Thereafter our contacts remained distinctly cool and distant.

He gave an official luncheon for me at the White House but although we met several times there was never an in-depth exchange of views on world problems. He had little regard for the United Nations. However, I am obliged to say that as to his views and actions in the field of foreign policy one could not but appreciate his knowledge, vision and skill. Of the four presidents with whom I have dealt, he was the best prepared for his diplomatic responsibilities.

I particularly admired the way in which he managed the opening-up of American attitudes towards the People's Republic of China, so ably furthered by Henry Kissinger. I doubt that any American President who did not have strong backing from American conservatives could have run such a high political risk. I also appreciated his management of the *détente* policy towards the Soviet Union. Both these initiatives contributed materially to an improvement in international relations at the time and their effect was quickly and beneficially evident at the United Nations.

I do not know where Nixon's input ended in these and other policies of his administration, and where Henry Kissinger's began. There was no doubt, however, of Kissinger's encompassing influence on American foreign policy during the first half of my tenure at the United Nations.

He also came to office as no friend of the United Nations, indeed as someone highly sceptical of its usefulness. He was certainly no believer in a universal world political order. Yet under the stress of the critical days of the October War of 1973, he began to understand how useful the United Nations could be. He recognized the constructive role the Security Council had played during the crisis and the way it quickly took action to send UN forces as a buffer between the belligerents. As he was fully aware, their prompt dispatch helped to avoid a direct military confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union.

The reasons for his success and influence are complex. First of all he is a very intelligent man, far above the average, and is aware of his skills. He is a well-trained scholar and historian. Because of his European and Jewish background he has a more specific understanding than many statesmen of

world history and the problems of the Middle East.

Even so, in world politics intelligence alone is not the determining factor. What counts is power. It is unrealistic to believe that the era of *Machtpolitik*, the politics of power, is over. The supreme quality of Henry Kissinger was that he had, and knew how to use, power in a productive fashion. In civilized discussion and negotiation he used this power in order to press the parties to accept the proposals he made. Without any bombast or threat, he conveyed to his partners in discussion that he represented the greatest power in the world and that if they did not use the opportunity he was offering, they would get nothing out of the whole exercise. A tough politician, he was able to convince most of his interlocutors that he was sincere and that he genuinely wanted a peaceful settlement; and he never shrank from the heart of the matter. He has an engaging sense of humour, and he never left anyone in any doubt as to where the bottom line in his position lay. His attitude was: 'If you want a solution, I shall go on'; otherwise he made it clear that he would return to Washington. His political power visibly grew with the downfall of Nixon during the Watergate scandal and, of course, afterwards during President Ford's short term in office. The limits which Nixon set on him in the early days of his governmental career became obvious to me in connection with the American bombing of the Vietnamese dykes. When I discussed my public criticism of the US air raids over the phone with Kissinger, he assured me that my statement was well understood and would not have any negative impact on my relations with the President. The next day, however, Nixon convened a special press conference vigorously rejecting my statement and calling me 'naive'.

Kissinger's Egyptian negotiating partner, Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi, whom I consider one of the best brains in the Arab world, later on blamed him for his 'tendency to manipulate people, his overbearing vanity and his determination to be at centre-stage'. But I personally had no reason to complain about him. Although I was fully aware that he was not in love with the UN, he regularly visited me in my office on the thirty-eighth floor, and made a point of giving joint press briefings after our meetings in front of the famous Chagall window in the UN lobby. Whatever he said on such occasions, I admired his skill in public relations.

Although the seventh special session of the UN Assembly – with Kissinger's thought-provoking speech – in 1975 introduced a greater degree of tolerance and understanding between the developing world and the industrialized nations, this encouraging start did not in itself guarantee a satisfactory outcome. There was still too much suspicion for anything like a complete meeting of minds to occur. I felt very strongly that this

favourable beginning must not be frittered away. Worried about the inertia that had characterized these negotiations, in the autumn of 1975 I sent private letters to Kissinger, Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa of Japan, and the Italian Foreign Minister, Mariano Rumor, in his capacity as a president of the European Economic Community, urging them to spare no effort to reach a consensus on the outstanding policy issues. Their replies, although phrased in general terms, were reassuring.

The major resolution that emerged from the seventh special session had been in effect a revision of the Declaration on the establishment of a New International Economic Order of the previous year. Covering most of the same ground, it was couched in a spirit of common effort by the two sides rather than in the peremptory demands of the original declaration and its accompanying programme of action. It stressed the need for greater co-operation between states and proposed 'concerted' action to achieve the goals of the new economic order.

One swallow does not make a summer. The deep-seated difference between North and South was not to be overcome between one month and the next. There was no adequate follow-up. In an attempt to get things moving, the focus of the North-South debate was shifted from the unwieldly General Assembly to a smaller group outside the United Nations – the Conference on International Economic Co-operation, consisting of twenty-seven representatives drawn from both sides, including seven members of OPEC. This body had been organized and convened on the initiative of Giscard d'Estaing and met in Paris. There were high hopes that it might bring about a breakthrough. I attended its initial phase in December 1975, but was soon obliged to come to the conclusion that it was faced with the same problems we had encountered in the United Nations and with the same uncompromising attitudes of the two sides.

The industrialized nations were interested primarily in discussing the energy problem but the developing countries insisted on linking it with general commodity, finance and development issues. The discussions dragged on for eighteen months, with relatively little to show for the effort. The basis was laid for a common fund to assist raw material producers and some money was made available for development programmes. The results were nevertheless meagre.

Ignoring for a moment the strict chronology of this book, I think it would be helpful here to recount later developments in the North-South dialogue. After the disappointing outcome of the Paris talks, the scene of action, if it can be called that, shifted back once more to the United Nations. Over the next few years the developing countries increasingly focused the Assembly's attention on what are called 'global negotiatons' covering the major aspects of economic co-operation and development.

During the last two years of my term of office, I made strenuous efforts to give these negotiations practical form. Working in formal and informal groups, the delegates to the General Assembly tried one expedient after another in search of a formula to enable further progress to be made.

The main thrust of the Third World countries was to attain their ends by seeking radical changes in the United Nations system as at present organized. Currently the levers of financial power lie in the hands of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), where the voting strength closely reflects economic and financial power. The South would like somehow to shift the venue of decision-making in these matters to the General Assembly, where they have the majority vote. In this they have been unsuccessful, since the specialized agencies concerned were created by separate treaties and are not subordinate to the United Nations. All the exhortations contained in the General Assembly resolutions adopted on these subjects have, by their ineffectiveness, only compounded the frustrations of the developing countries and the irritation of the developed.

I do not mean to imply that all the fault in these attitudes lies on one side. If the developing countries are too rigid in their approach, the industrialized nations have hardly responded with excessive generosity to the proposals of the impoverished South. Their official development aid lags far behind the levels they have themselves accepted as targets. They have been more inclined to stand pat on their negative response to the new international economic order than to make concrete and constructive counter-proposals.

When Rüdiger von Wechmar, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations, became President of the 1980 General Assembly, he made the effort to get a set of global negotiations under way as the central theme of his term of office. There was no one better suited to the task. Wechmar was a disciple of the former German Chancellor Willy Brandt, perhaps the leading Western protagonist of the Third World's development cause. Wechmar represented one of the West's most successful and prosperous countries, enjoying great influence in the counsels of the North.

It was towards the end of the General Assembly in 1980 that some of the leading representatives of the Third World, together with Rüdiger von Wechmar, visited me in my office in an atmosphere of despair, telling me that all their efforts to work out a compromise solution for global negotiations had failed. They referred to my good personal relations with President Jimmy Carter and asked me to intervene with him in order to get America's consent to the latest compromise proposals of the Group of 77. The timing was hardly auspicious. The presidential election was only a

few weeks away. Nevertheless I had a long telephone conversation with the President and asked him to take a good look at the proposals, bearing in mind that the developing countries believed that America was the major obstacle in the way of starting negotiations.

This the President said he would do, but he reminded me that it was a difficult period for him. He made three main points. First, he said, the United States could not accept anything that would give the United Nations General Assembly any sort of authority over the IMF, the World Bank or GATT. Second, we should bear in mind that the American Congress took a jaundiced view of the United Nations, so much so that he had serious problems in getting funds appropriated by the Congress for the American contribution. Thirdly, he remarked that because of being in an election campaign he had to be cautious. If we were not careful, our actions could become counter-productive, he warned. It was in the interests of the United Nations not to push him too far.

What alarmed me was that the emotions engendered by the strident demands of the Third World and the recalcitrance, if not indifference, of the West, were destroying the credit of the United Nations and might ultimately even tear it apart. This, I considered, would be a tragedy. Virtually every country in the West agreed in theory that the abyss yawning between the rich and the poor peoples was an evil to be combatted. They agreed also that the process of development would bring benefits to the North as well as to the South. If only both sides were guided by this underlying common interest, I felt that a dialogue could eventually produce at least partial results.

It was Willy Brandt himself who suggested a possible formula. As the head of a distinguished group of former statesmen, including Edward Heath of Great Britain and leading private citizens, he had been instrumental in drawing up an exhaustive, widely publicized report on the need to re-order North-South relations to meet the challenges of the new decade. It envisaged a global agreement resulting from a joint effort of political will and a high degree of trust among the negotiating partners, with a common conviction of mutual interest. An essential step in achieving this objective would be a summit meeting of some twenty world leaders, representative of the major groupings, to produce guide-lines and a new impetus for future negotiations.

The former Chancellor came to see me in New York in February 1980 and handed me a copy of his Commission's report with a request to circulate it to all members. He asked me if I would organize the summit meeting envisaged. I was obliged to tell him that due to the lack of a mandate from any organ of the UN I could not act as the convenor of such a conference. Moreover, it was not for me to select the participants as I knew

out of my long experience that this would immediately lead to criticism by those who had not been invited. There would be irresistible pressure to expand the membership so broadly that it would lose focus and effectiveness. We then decided that we would select two co-chairmen for the conference, one from the North and the other from the South. Together they would choose the other participants.

Brandt asked me to proceed along these lines. Our initial choice for the co-chairman from the North was the Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. As his colleague from the South we decided to approach the President of Mexico, José Lopez Portillo, who had indicated his interest to us. Brandt also asked me to try to persuade the Soviet Union to attend the meeting, but I knew that this would be pointless. The Russians have never considered participating in multilateral economic aid programmes to developing countries. Nevertheless I did take up the matter with Gromyko during my Moscow visit in June 1981. He answered at once that they were not interested and would not attend. I attempted to stress how useful a Soviet contribution to the North-South dialogue would be. Gromyko retorted by insisting that the problems facing the Third World in the economic sphere were the result of colonialism. The Soviet Union had never been a colonial power and had no reason to get involved in the consequences of Western imperialism. 'It is up to them to make up for what they have done to the countries of the Third World,' he said. 'We shall not attend because we do not wish to be placed in the same category as the Western powers.' He did add that the Soviet Union would render economic help to the developing countries. 'We shall of course help them, but we shall do so on a bilateral basis.'

I thought that the easier task would be with my fellow-Austrian Bruno Kreisky, so I approached him first. We had a long talk together in Vienna and he responded positively, but with one reservation: 'I have to be sure that the main industrialized countries support me in this undertaking. I can't do it on my own,' he said. He consulted the Americans, the Germans and the French, and when they responded favourably he went ahead.

Lopez Portillo reacted immediately. As the successor to Luis Echeverría, who had played such a prominent part in the UN special assemblies on this issue, he was predisposed to take an active part, proposed Cancun as the meeting place and joined with Kreisky in issuing the invitations.

Only a few weeks before the conference was due to meet, Bruno Kreisky fell ill. The Austrian government, in consultation with Lopez Portillo and others, invited the Canadian Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, to replace him. Fortunately he was able to make himself available and was his usual forceful and effective self. I took part as representative of the United Nations and we foregathered in October 1981.

Instructive for us, and also for him, was the presence of President Reagan. This was his first major exposure to Third World leaders as a group and he told me before we dispersed that he had found it an educational experience. There were twenty-three delegations and the arrangements were both sumptuous and relaxed. The tables in the main conference hall were arranged in a huge circle. Reagan, in a short-sleeved shirt, was inevitably the centre of attention, with all the other participants watching him carefully to see whether he was prepared to yield on any of the points that were so freely made to him. He was exceedingly courteous and genial, but always tough on substance, and yielded very little. The main conference sessions never took on the form of negotiations but there were many bilateral talks in the surrounding offices and at the luncheons, dinners and social occasions, where careful organization ensured that no group was ever the same twice.

I was much impressed by the forcefulness and clarity with which Mrs Gandhi supported the views of her Third World colleagues. She was very outspoken, but always left the way open for some understanding between the main participants. She was a world leader of the highest quality and her recent assassination is a bitter tragedy for all those with the interests of international understanding at heart.

The Chinese delegation was led by their Prime Minister, Zhao Zi Yang. He gave the impression of being a technocrat and administrator rather than the repository of high-level political power. He has a warm and sympathetic personality and gets on well with Europeans. He is also very close to Deng Xiaoping, who comes from the south-western province of Sichuan, of which Zhao was at one time the governor.

During the conference he played a low-key role, listening more than speaking: an attitude which seemed to fit his character and the basic policy of the Peking government. The Chinese still regard themselves as an under-developed country belonging to the Third World, without any ambition to play the role of a major power. They admit publicly that it will take them a long time to catch up with the other main powers. They are far behind in technology and even in technical infrastructure. Their teeming millions are hard-working and one day they will catch up with the Western world and the Soviet Union, but not soon. In my own judgement it will take them several decades; in the meantime they try desperately to acquire know-how from the Western world. Their conflict with the Soviets continues. Whether this will change with the advent of Gorbachev is open to question.

There was a sharp exchange, in the course of the conference, between President Nyerere and Pierre Trudeau. Nyerere, who is never short of words, had launched into a lengthy intervention to establish that although

Tanzania was a socialist country it would welcome private investment. Trudeau was quick to respond. He asked the Tanzanian President whether he really thought that the Western nations would invest more in his country, knowing that sooner or later their investments would be jeopardized by government intervention. Nyerere and his Third World colleagues were momentarily nonplussed by the retort, but suddenly loud laughter broke out, not least from Nyerere himself, and the meeting went on to other matters.

Regrettably the conference did not lead to any major change in the running controversy over the demands of the less developed countries for a new economic order. True to form of summit meetings, Cancun was long on harmonious generalities but short on practical results. Like so many other top-level gatherings, it provided no opportunity for the hard slog of detailed bargaining which must precede any agreement on so complex and controversial a subject. The conference made no provision for following up on its pronouncements or for making a start on global negotiations. With the onset of the recession of the 1980s, the focus shifted to short-term measures needed to save the developing countries from economic collapse. Each side took note of the views of the other and referred the whole matter back to the United Nations, where new efforts of another kind will have to be made if the world is to be relieved of this fundamental and agonizing conflict.

In all the years of my professional life as a diplomat, I learned one basic truth: it is personalities more than anything else which influence the destiny of the world. Out of this conviction, right at the beginning of my term of office as Secretary General I started to visit as many world leaders as possible. These trips to nearly all the capitals of the globe offered me the welcome opportunity not only to meet these personalities, but also to grasp the political environment in which they had to operate. Coming myself from the industrialized North, I made it a particular point to cultivate the leaders of the Third World countries which had swollen the membership of the organization. As they achieved independence, the new political leaders were primarily concerned to establish their control domestically, but most of them quickly realized how valuable the United Nations could be to them. It gave them an international sounding board and a training ground for their officials in modern diplomacy. On their own, their international influence was limited, but united in their regional and non-aligned group they gained importance and sometimes dominated the work of the organization. There was a constant flow of heads of state and other leaders from the Third World countries to the regular annual sessions of the General Assembly. Jointly and individually, they left their mark.

I owe Marshal Tito a posthumous mention for his sturdily independent foreign policy, which established Yugoslavia as a non-aligned country. He always impressed me with his straightforwardness and his strong support for the United Nations. He was frequently critical of it, usually on the grounds that it was too inactive in international affairs and suffered from a lack of clout, but his approach was as constructive as it was frank.

We used to meet in New York and Belgrade and I was a frequent guest of his on the two-island complex of Brioni in the Adriatic off the Yugoslav coast. Under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the islands had been mosquito-ridden and uninhabited. An Austrian named Kuppelwieser had made them habitable. When Tito came to power, he had constructed handsome hotels and guest houses on the larger island and a residence for himself, surrounded by a beautiful garden, on the smaller. He lived very comfortably there, indulging in his various hobbies, which included a private zoo, where he kept a collection of exotic animals sent to him as gifts by foreign political leaders. His other hobby was to build household furniture in a small workshop set in the midst of vineyards he had himself planted. He was proud of his wines and made a point of serving them with fish caught in the surrounding waters.

Two factors influenced his views on foreign policy. The first was a deep fear of the Russians, particularly after the 1968 'Prague Spring' liberalization movement had been destroyed by Soviet forces. He used to tax us Austrians with what he described as our complacency in the face of the Soviet menace. 'You people are too naive,' he said. 'Don't believe that you are not in danger. I have had my experiences with the Russians. They are capable of doing anything.' He was insistent that we remained on our guard against a Soviet military thrust through Austria and south to the Dalmatian coast.

His second great foreign policy concern was to strengthen the structure of East-West *détente* and the Non-Aligned Movement, thus creating a global equilibrium as a foundation for peace. The last years of his life left him a deeply disappointed man. He witnessed a deterioration in superpower relationships and the erosion of non-alignment as it fell under the increasing influence of the more radical Third World states.

I last saw Tito in a guest house in Havana during the 1979 summit conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. He was obviously physically ill and also deeply depressed. He was particularly concerned over the election of Cuba to chair the meeting, although the host country at these conferences is normally granted that honour. As the more radical leaders established their predominance, Tito's dismay increased. He was deeply exercised as to how the Non-Aligned Movement could maintain its credibility if Cuba, with its close links to the Soviet Union, were its leader.

The Cubans are extremely active in both the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement, although I did not meet Fidel Castro personally until I paid an official visit to Havana in January 1979. He is a charismatic figure, with a strong and magnetic personality and quite an attractive spontaneity in his manner. Greeting me at the airport, he asked immediately: 'Do you want the usual diplomatic protocol, complete with receptions and social events, or would you prefer me to take you to some islands where we can have our talks in peace and quiet?'

There was only one answer to such a loaded question and it suited my own preference. We changed our clothes at a nearby guest house and flew by helicopter to the island of La Juventud a few miles to the south. This is where Castro maintains his education and paramilitary centre for young African students, principally from Angola, Mozambique and Namibia. The youngsters were all in uniform and went through their paces with enthusiasm.

Castro had organized a small dinner for my party with only his closest advisers present. After a general discussion on the international situation, he came to what was obviously uppermost in his mind, the state of relations between Cuba and the United States. He launched a bitter attack against the American administration for rejecting all his efforts to establish better contacts. The Americans were not even permitted to export medicines badly needed in Cuba and he had to seek them in Europe and elsewhere. He almost pleaded with me to use all my influence to persuade the American government and people that he really wanted good relations. I assured Castro that I would inform Washington of his views.

The following day we flew to his private island, which he called his 'little Brioni'. It is a lovely spot, although still primitive, and our talks took place on his yacht, which was tied up at a small dock. The business of the day was interrupted by a session of swimming and harpoon fishing, at which our host excelled. We observed that the group of security men who protected him were principally engaged in finding the largest shoals of fish.

As he sat on the edge of the boat, a steward approached with two glasses on a small silver tray, each filled with a dark liquid. Castro first took a sip from one glass, gargled heartily and spat the contents into the sea. Then he took the other glass and swallowed its contents before diving in. I was told later that the first contained Listerine and the other whisky. Apparently this was his manner of fortifying himself against the rigours of skin-diving.

However that may be, he caught several dozen red snappers and lobsters. He personally prepared lunch; it consisted mainly of the raw seafood garnished with lemon juice, which he insisted was the best way to eat it. I have frequently been willing to sacrifice my digestive system in the

interest of international understanding, but this went beyond my normal bounds. As I found out later, Fidel Castro's strange way of preparing raw lobster was not so bad after all. Friends of ours did it the same way in Connecticut and loved it.

As on the previous evening, our talks concentrated mainly on Cuban-American relations. If this seemed a case of dialectical overkill, there was doubtless a special reason for it. At Castro's insistence, Bradford Morse, the highly respected administrator of the UN Development Programme, had been invited to all our functions for general discussions and to celebrate the opening of a new sugar mill built with the help of his organization.

Morse was a former American Congressman, well connected in Washington, and Castro doubtless wanted to use him as an additional channel to get his message through to the administration. Morse handled the situation very well.

On our departure Castro noticed my small rented aircraft standing on the airport apron. It was an old and somewhat shabby-looking Falcon, with space for only nine people. Professing astonishment, he asked me with disbelief in his voice: 'Are you going back in that thing? Is it safe enough?' I assured him that it was and that in any event I had no choice. The United Nations does not possess its own aeroplane for the Secretary General or anyone else. It rents and charters the planes it uses. I consoled myself with the thought that, if my dignity had been impaired, I might at least have convinced Castro and his revolutonary comrades of the capitalist frugality of the UN organization.

One figure in the Third World merits special respect: King Hussein of Jordan. I visited him on many occasions and was always impressed by the blend of shrewdness, wisdom and courage which he displayed. Small in stature, precise and careful in speech, he has survived the turmoil besetting his country from outside as well as from its large and unruly Palestinian elements within. He combines courage with cautious diplomacy. A highly intelligent man, he supports a Western style of life while maintaining deep roots in Moslem traditions. Experience has taught him the value of prudence. As a young boy, he saw his father assassinated by Palestinian extremists while standing on the steps of a mosque in Jerusalem. His engagement in the Six-Day War of 1967 cost him Arab Jerusalem and his territory on the West Bank of the Jordan. These were hard lessons indeed.

His reluctance to respond to Western proposals that he should negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians should come as no surprise. He can only do so with the approval of the other Arab states. His *rapprochement* with Arafat

and his joint approach to President Mubarek clearly show were his aspirations lie. Mubarek supports Hussein's policies to the best of his abilities, but he too must be wary of provoking his fundamentalists. The joint endeavours to involve Washington actively in the peace process and to negotiate with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation have met with considerable American reserve. For his part, President Reagan is facing a strong Israeli lobby which seeks to thwart all contact with the PLO. It is also no surprise that Muhammad Gaddafi should reject Hussein's proposals.

I received repeated invitations from Colonel Gaddafi to visit him in Libya. It was always one of my problems to visit certain countries at the right time, because such personal encounters are immediately interpreted by the international media as a gesture of support for this or that government. In the case of Gaddafi – whom I met in August 1977 in Tripoli – it was particularly delicate because of his alleged support of terrorist activities. When I brought this up with him, he reacted sharply and indignantly. It was absolutely untrue, he said, that he was supporting international terrorism. All he did and would continue to do was to support liberation movements, which had, he asserted, even under the UN Charter, the right to fight for their independence. That could be done without acts of terrorism. When I left Gaddafi one simple thought again came to my mind: as long as there is no objective distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters, it will always be left to governments and people to make their own subjective assessment. Nevertheless I always find it important to keep contact with all political leaders whatever their ideology and public image may be. It does not help to create a group of political outcasts when one day their co-operation may be needed to solve an international problem.

President Houari Boumédienne of Algeria and I had several encounters over the economic demands of the Third World and the plight of Polisario hostages on his border. He was not an easy man to deal with but I managed to establish good relations with him and he was quite co-operative. He was highly critical of the attitudes of the industrialized nations and known for his tough, rigid approach in the negotiations on the new economic order.

Boumédienne was equally at odds with his neighbour, King Hassan of Morocco, whose army had taken over the former Spanish colony of the Western Sahara. The Algerian President had reacted violently, accusing King Hassan of imperialism. The territory was so sparsely populated that neither the Spanish records, the Algerians, the Moroccans nor the UN were ever able to determine exactly how many people lived there. The best guess was between eighty and one hundred thousand, predominantly

nomads, among whom it would have been almost impossible to conduct a referendum to determine their political future.

King Hassan was equally intransigent and almost as difficult to deal with. His firm position that the former Spanish Sahara was an integral part of Morocco – rejecting all claims of the liberation movement Polisario for an independent state – created a deep division within the OAU. When, in 1984, Polisario was admitted under the name 'Arab Democratic Republic of Sahrawi' as a full member to the OAU, Morocco and her friends left the organization, creating a most serious crisis for the OAU. On one visit I had great difficulty in obtaining an appointment with the King. So I indicated to his staff that I wished to present him with the United Nations peace medal, a gold medallion which I made a practice of giving to all the Heads of State I visited during my term of office. The King received me the following morning. He also invited me to join him in the royal train, in which, as it turned out, he was making a tour to mobilize public opinion as part of the 'green march' designed to annex the Spanish Sahara. This placed me in an entirely false position, but fortunately there were no unpleasant repercussions.

The chief victim of this unhappy dispute was the President of Mauritania, Mr Moktar Ould Daddah, who had been persuaded by the Moroccans to occupy the southern part of the territory abandoned by the Spaniards. Daddah was a modest-looking man, educated in France and married to a French lady whose hobby was writing books for children. His official residence had such limited facilities that his reception and dinner for me took place in a tent put up in the garden. We squatted on cushions cross-legged and were served with the traditional racks of lamb, although I managed to avoid eating the eyes when they were served. The Sahara situation was clearly beyond his control and the Polisario liberation units continuously attacked the fragile forces of the Mauritanian army. After a number of palace revolutions Ould Daddah was deposed in a bloodless coup and the Mauritanian government had to surrender its claim to the Western Sahara in 1979.

Much happier were my relationships with two outstanding African leaders, President Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal and President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. Both are highly cultivated men, former members of the French National Assembly and experienced statesmen. Their influence in the shaping of African policies towards the former colonial powers was of greatest importance. Senghor is a philosopher and poet of international standing and Houphouët-Boigny one of the wisest men the African continent has produced. Defenders of the free market economy, their countries were among the more prosperous nations in Africa.

Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia is another African leader of great stature. His honesty and personal warmth have created many friends in the United Nations and in the world at large. He is a strong defender of the continent's interests and a determined opponent of South Africa's apartheid policies. He is also a very religious man. At a dinner party during my first official visit, in 1973, he turned to me and asked: 'Are you a Protestant or a Catholic?' I was somewhat surprised by the question and must have shown it, because he went on: 'I have two priests here at the table, one Catholic and one Protestant, to say grace but I have to know on whom I should call.'

Dignity and protocol were not always maintained during these trips. Although it is some time ago now, I cannot forget a visit I paid to Kenya in the summer of 1974 to see President Kenyatta. I was informed that he would receive me in the small village of Nakuru, some way from the capital, where he was opening the agricultural fair. I was flown there in a special aircraft and arrived in the middle of the ceremony. Prizes were being given to the best bulls, and tribal dancers then filled the arena. Suddenly Kenyatta turned to me and asked whether I would like to join him in congratulating them. I saw no harm in this and accompanied him into their midst, where, after a few exchanges, he took me by the hand and suggested we join the dance. This aroused universal enthusiasm and applause but I could not help asking myself whether it had been a worthwhile visit when, instead of having political talks with Kenyatta, I ended up in a cattle show dancing with him.

Perhaps my most embarrassing experience was at Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso. This was part of a tour of the drought-stricken Sahel region – stretching from Senegal in the west to Ethiopia and Somalia in the east – which I undertook in February 1974. My itinerary included seventeen countries in an attempt to co-ordinate the UN emergency relief operation for tens of thousands who were starving. The co-ordinating committee had been summoned to his modest capital by President Lamizana and it was planned that I should go on to the balcony of his official residence to make an appeal to the international community for further help to these stricken people. Television and radio were in attendance and even before leaving New York I had prepared a dramatic plea to read out to the thousands of people I had been promised would be standing in the square in front of the palace. When we got out on to the balcony there was not a soul to be seen. I turned to the President, asking for an explanation. It soon became clear that the minister in charge of the event had forgotten to make any public announcement of my speech and therefore no one had turned up. In order to salvage something from the occasion I recorded my address for subsequent use.

What would appear to be yet another example of Third World governments in disarray is in fact merely symptomatic of a much more profound and complicated problem common to all developing countries. It is all too easy to blame them for their lack of experience and absence of infrastructure, but that only detracts from the root cause of the developing countries' present plight. The economic, political, social and cultural problems confronting the developing countries are legion; equally divergent are the means for overcoming hunger, poverty and injustice that are put forward by the members of the UN in their endeavours to support the development of the Third World. In the final analysis, all development models are part and parcel of specific social models. Having seen and heard a plethora of programmes and concepts during my ten years of office, I see no merit in adding to the confusion by bringing forward new proposals. To my mind, and based on my experience, certain basic principles hold true and must be subscribed to if any long-term development strategy is to succeed:

> Hitherto, development aid, both in its conception and in its implementation, has adhered to foreign models; such an approach was doomed, since it made no allowance for those features peculiar to society in the developing countries. The education system propagated in most developing countries, for example, does not meet real social needs. Illiteracy rates are still climbing because most developing countries have not been able to introduce primary education on a general scale. Higher education is often seen as a sign of social achievement, a kind of status symbol, while technical education and vocational training are still not considered priorities. A new educational system suited to the specific needs of the individual countries is a major factor in socio-economic development and should be recognized as such.
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> Self-reliance is a deeply rooted tradition in the developing countries; it offers a firm basis on which sensible aid programmes can be developed. For example, a plan of action oriented towards the achievement of self-sufficiency in food should be the guiding principle for all international efforts to combat famine and starvation, particularly in Africa.
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> Most developing countries can be seen to be suffering from an identity crisis which takes on the form of bitter and sometimes violent attempts to reassert their cultural identity. Unfortunately, this particular issue is sometimes taken as a pretext for diverting public attention away from pressing day-to-day problems, and it is sometimes exploited for purely ideological reasons. In shaping aid

programmes and promoting economic co-operation, the international community should recognize the aspirations of the individual countries and foster their traditional values. Approached from this angle, a country's assertion of its cultural heritage will proceed within the right context, rather than be debased to a mere political slogan.

The gap between rural and urban areas is forever widening: development, services and infrastructure are wanting in rural areas, with the result that the unending waves of urban immigration give rise to awesome conurbations and new social problems. Rural development should thus take on priority in any development plan.

The absence of planned infrastructure incurs a wastage of valuable resources and under-utilization of machinery and equipment. Steps should thus be taken on an international scale to assist the developing countries in building up the infrastructure needed to absorb new technologies and subsequently to adapt them to prevailing conditions.

National security is a major concern in the developing countries, whose independence is for the most part still young. Unfortunately, in their search for external and internal security the majority of them fall within the super-powers' sphere of influence. Given this situation, an atmosphere of relative peace and security conducive to development is one of the most important preconditions for improving the living standards of the poor nations.

As I write, the North-South issue is as far from resolution as ever. The recovery of the industrialized states from the most recent recession has been uneven and precarious. Most of the poorest developing countries, and even many of those more prosperous, are in dire straits, while a number of them are weighed down by onerous debt burdens and high interest rates. The quest for a new international economic order has perforce given way to more immediate, practical concerns. Developed and developing countries alike are striving to prevent massive defaults on international loans, and an increasing mood of protectionism is jeopardizing international markets.

In a crisis situation emergency measures are required. But deep-seated maladjustments and persistent world economic difficulties call for longer-term solutions. If world prosperity is to be restored on a sustainable basis, all concerned must take responsible and concerted action: North and South, market and centrally-planned economies, oil-exporting and oil-importing countries, governments, international organizations and the private sector, including the banks. Only through the co-ordinated efforts

of all these institutions shall we be able to shake off our present difficulties and advance anew.

However necessary and however beneficial the spontaneous raising of funds throughout the world may be in terms of saving the lives of hundreds of thousands in Africa and Asia, it has nothing to do with the kind of development policy under discussion here. Long-term development aid should in no way be considered a form of charity to any country. It should be based on enlightened self-interest in the industrialized countries. The recognition of global economic interdependence, which has emerged particularly in the past decade, has established a direct and strong link between the developed and the developing world.

Whereas the South needs help to help itself if it is to overcome hunger and misery, the North needs the markets and purchasing power of the South. The prosperity of the Third World is, therefore, ineluctably linked to global trade. If trade expands, the world economy expands. Moreover, I cannot foresee international security being firmly established for generations to come as long as islands of wealth persist in a sea of world poverty. The basic truth remains – neither side can prosper without the other.

Step One

major crisis area of the continent. I have no doubt that their policy of racial discrimination will one day collapse. The white man has long realized, despite his fear of annihilation, that he cannot do away with his black compatriots. The black population has long been aware that the white man is not a colonialist in South Africa but has the right to live there. A genuine dialogue is crucial, and both sides must recognize that they need each other. I hope it is not too late for the necessary revolution of the spirit.

8

The New Majority

During the whole of the seventies, when I was Secretary General, world attention focused mainly on wars, conflicts and international crises and on how these were dealt with by the United Nations. Unfortunately this led to a misconception about the work of the world organization. Since the attitudes of the member governments very often did not permit the UN to discharge its duties as foreseen in the Charter, the image of the United Nations deteriorated. Although I fully recognize the importance of the political role of the organization, during my term of office I was faced with a new challenge, the handling of a new phenomenon, namely the growing gap between the rich countries in the North and the poor countries in the South of the globe.

In a world which had not really taken note of the historic dimension of this dramatic awakening in the Third World, the United Nations was the one single place where these forces could express themselves and mobilize the community of nations to draw attention to their plight.

The influx of newly independent countries radically altered the entire character of the United Nations. This massive group of Third World nations was not beholden to the West; it was encouraged, but not controlled, by the Soviet bloc. Its leaders proved highly adept at establishing operational groupings within the organization. In addition to continental and regional groups, they formed two over-arching organizations that included the vast majority of United Nations membership. In the political sphere, the Non-Aligned Movement was designed to function as a third force which could remain aloof from East-West alliances and manoeuvres. Their founding fathers were Tito, Nehru and Nasser, together with the Indonesian President Sukarno. A parallel organization, the 'Group of 77' (actually, now over 125 states), was set up in order to advance the economic and social development of its membership. Each of these groups met periodically to concert strategy and tactics. Their

cohesion has remained remarkable, in spite of the fact that they include a number of oil-rich developing countries. This has failed to disturb their common front.

These overlapping coalitions now include virtually all the non-white, non-Western states in Asia and Africa, the bulk of the countries in South America and even a few Soviet allies such as Cuba, Vietnam and the Mongolian People's Republic. They have transformed the parliamentary structure of the United Nations. Bloc politics tends to dominate decision-making. The new majority of the Third World overwhelms the outnumbered West. East-West rivalries, while still predominant in global terms, have become relatively less prominent in United Nations affairs.

The goals of these new members are egalitarian. The bulk of the wealth, scientific and technological skills, educational talent and productive capacity in the world is concentrated in a relatively few states. As long as this continues, the anti-colonial revolution, in the eyes of the less developed countries, cannot be considered complete.

On their own, most of these countries could do little to make their case persuasively. But in the United Nations, where all states enjoy the same voting rights, the situation is different. By joining forces, the smaller states can, within broad limits, control most of the decisions. To be sure, the word 'decisions' is, in most cases, a misnomer. In the General Assembly there are only recommendations, without binding effect. Even so they are not to be ignored, and over the course of time are bound to influence thought and action.

In order to facilitate the development process, the General Assembly created in 1964 the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Three years later the UN Assembly established the UN Industrial Development Organization to assist the developing countries. It is now in the process of becoming a fully fledged specialized agency of the UN with its own separately funded budget.

Both the agenda and the membership of the world organization were evolving in a way not foreseen by its founding fathers. It soon became apparent that what the new Third World majority was seeking was nothing less than a revolution in the world economy, to be won less by coercion than by the power of persuasion in the international forum. They demanded fairness and justice; fairness because they did not accept that three-quarters of the world's population living in the under-developed countries should enjoy only one-fifth of its gross income; justice because, in their eyes, the old colonial powers had gained their wealth by exploiting the peoples and resources of their former possessions. To redress the balance they should now agree to a massive transfer of resources to the countries of the south.

There had indeed been examples in post-war history of such acts of enlightened self-interest as the Marshall Plan, the American Alliance for Progress, and European Community arrangements for economic assistance to their former African, Caribbean and Pacific territories under the Lomé Conventions. These programmes had one feature in common: they combined economic aid with the strengthening of alliances, or at least enhanced political affinity.

In contrast, the demands the Third World countries made on the Western industrialized states offered no comparable rewards. Their more radical leaders seldom based their claims in the context of mutual benefits. They spoke of the redressing of wrongs, and economic and social development, not as an aspiration but as a right to which they were entitled. It was an approach which produced confrontation rather than accommodation of views. The Third World could not achieve its purposes without the participation of the industrialized states they were attacking. The result of this policy in the United Nations was chronic acrimony and frustration.

One group, the bloc of Marxist states, stood largely aloof from the whole debate. The Soviet Union and its supporters, and also China, regarded development as a responsibility of the former colonial powers. They supported the argument that it was for the Western countries to compensate the developing nations for the exploitation to which they had been subjected in an earlier era. The Marxist countries hardly participated in the multilateral development activities of the UN. They preferred to pursue their own bilateral aid programmes.

Obviously, the industrialized countries were reluctant to accept blanket liability for the alleged evils of colonialism and imperialism. They were willing to make adjustments in existing institutions and practices to meet the pressing needs of the South, but the improvements they proposed were incremental rather than radical. They insisted that economic development was a complex and lengthy process. They refused to – as they put it – give money and credit, machinery, infrastructure and technical assistance to countries lacking the personnel, organization and experience to absorb them.

It must be said that they did not have to look far to find instances of the failure of ill-considered development projects, or examples of lack of co-ordination among donor agencies and waste and corruption among the recipients. The cost of major aid programmes was high. To grant trade preferences or guarantee higher prices for raw materials, or to extend financial aid on concessionary terms, involved a real cost to the industries, consumers and tax-payers of the developed countries. They preferred to rely as far as possible on market forces to increase the productive capacity

of the poorer nations.

Both personally and in terms of my constitutional position, I felt considerable sympathy for the basic position of the South. In all good conscience, nations which had subscribed to the UN Charter's pursuit of 'better standards of life in larger freedom' could not stand passively by in the face of massive poverty, hunger, ill-health and illiteracy. The disparity between the two worlds was not diminishing but to a considerable extent increasing. Remedial action was necessary, and in my judgement it could only be carried out on a world scale if the UN organization participated in a major way. The facts were incontrovertible. In the North, one-fourth of the world's population possessed more than nine-tenths of its manufacturing industry and received more than four-fifths of its income. In the South, more than 1½ billion people lived in countries with a gross national product averaging less than $250 per head per year.

Realistically, however, the process could not be a one-way street. Whatever the help from outside, a critical factor in development would be the self-reliant effort of the countries in the south themselves.

Nothing would be accomplished if the two sides dug in on extreme positions and used the United Nations to launch verbal broadsides at each other. I therefore devoted myself to a search for areas of agreement, the advocacy of moderation and gradualism and the continuation of a dialogue between the parties.

When I assumed office the industrial world was ending a decade of exceptional growth. The UN had established an 'international development strategy' to set economic targets, and while the major industrialized nations had expressed some reservations, they had endorsed the general principle of moving by co-operation towards a more just and rational world economic and social order. The decade of the seventies was one of sharp and painful economic adjustments. The system of fixed exchange rates created by the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 had collapsed and, in 1973/4, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ended the era of cheap energy by quadrupling the price of oil. These events shook the world economic system, but their weight fell most heavily on the poorest countries, which lacked the reserves and productive resources to cope. Even the richer nations went into recession, resulting in a combination of inflation and unemployment.

The oil shock galvanized the more outspoken leaders of the Group of 77. They saw that their oil-rich brothers had wrested control of their natural resources from the multinational corporations. They had sharply reversed the adverse terms of trade from which the former colonial territories habitually suffered. The invulnerability of the North had been challenged and the other developing countries, particularly those with other market-

able assets, hoped to make comparable gains.

Under the leadership of President Houari Boumédienne of Algeria, at that time the head of the non-aligned group, they called for a special session of the General Assembly in April 1974 'with a view to establishing a new system of relations based on equality and the common interests of all states'. Boumédienne was peremptory, proclaiming the failure of the international development strategy and attributing this to the lack of political will on the part of the developed countries to take the required urgent action, and the inadequacy of the growth targets in relation to the real needs of the South.

He sustained this combative tone in the conversation we had at the outset of this sixth special session in New York. The real issue, he said, was economic domination of the poor by the rich. The Third World now had real bargaining power by virtue of their natural resources. In order to avoid confrontation, both sides should initiate a responsible dialogue. The industrialized nations would have to change their policies and demonstrate a political will to co-operate. What his group hoped for from the Assembly was nothing less than the forging of a new international economic order.

He insisted that the position of the United States would be particularly significant. I told him that I knew from my contacts in Washington that the American administration was taking a passive attitude towards the special session. For my own part I felt that the US must participate actively in the work of the session if it was to have any meaning. It would become highly undesirable for them to be isolated in the Assembly, and I persuaded them to assume a more active role. At the same time I advised Boumédienne to seek a constructive compromise.

The special session in 1974 was not to be guided by counsels of moderation. It adopted a resolution providing for fundamental changes in the entire structure of international economic relations, including provisions on commodities, trade and industrialization, natural resources, food, finance and multinational corporations. The countries of the North were not prepared to respond in depth to these far-reaching proposals. They did not vote against the resulting 'Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New Economic Order', but they made it clear through numerous reservations that they would not comply.

At the regular Assembly session the following autumn, the same adversarial spirit prevailed. This time the Group of 77 united behind a proposed 'Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States' which had been drafted by President Luis Echeverría of Mexico. This declared that every state had 'the sovereign and inalienable right' to choose its own economic, political, social and cultural systems without any outside interference and should exercise 'full permanent sovereignty' over its

wealth, natural resources and economic activities. The developing nations were to have the sole right to decide for themselves the terms for compensating expropriated foreign enterprises.

These demands brought North-South relations in the organization to a new low. Most of the larger industrialized countries resented the verbal attacks and far-reaching demands of the majority. They were unwilling to abandon the existing economic system. If additional aid was to be made available for development, the countries of the North would have to provide most of it. As oil importers they were already making a massive transfer of financial resources to the OPEC countries and they now demanded that these should share in any major programmes to assist those less developed. The session ended in disarray.

The developing countries dismissed the proposal put forward by the West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, that instead of the same old long catalogue of impossible demands they should draw up a list of the things they wanted in some order of priority so that negotiations could start. The representatives of the Third World alone rejected it as patchwork politics where radical action was needed.

Nevertheless, as the months passed, as a result of constant interchanges at the UN passions cooled and more moderate views emerged. A seventh special session of the General Assembly was held in the first half of September 1975. The contrast with its predecessor was remarkable. The developed countries, and particularly the United States, had evidently decided that a purely negative posture would help neither party. In a highlight speech the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, put forward a number of promising proposals in a spirit of reconciliation. Kissinger had begun to recognize the usefulness of the UN for Washington's foreign policies and obviously wanted to make a gesture to reduce Third World sceptism towards the United States.

He outlined a broad range of new international machinery, with offers of additional financial resources in response to the developing countries' needs in the fields of commodities, trade, finance, industrialization and food production. Others adopted a similarly conciliatory tone and an intensive effort began to reach common ground. The special session reached its conclusions by consensus and its work contributed to an improvement of economic relations between North and South.

In all candour I would have to admit that the promise of the seventh special session has not been realized in anything like the form then envisaged.

It was the merit of Henry Kissinger that the relationship between the United Nations and the Nixon administration, which had previously been

overshadowed by the controversy over Vietnam, improved progressively, although Nixon himself remained in the background. My relations with the President had been ambivalent. During my first year of office I had put out a public statement concerning the alleged American bombing of the dykes around Hanoi. I appealed on humanitarian grounds to cease operations that led to so much suffering. President Nixon had reacted in sharp tones. The Vietnam War was becoming extremely unpopular and doubtless my intervention was unwelcome, particularly in the period leading up to his second election. Thereafter our contacts remained distinctly cool and distant.

He gave an official luncheon for me at the White House but although we met several times there was never an in-depth exchange of views on world problems. He had little regard for the United Nations. However, I am obliged to say that as to his views and actions in the field of foreign policy one could not but appreciate his knowledge, vision and skill. Of the four presidents with whom I have dealt, he was the best prepared for his diplomatic responsibilities.

I particularly admired the way in which he managed the opening-up of American attitudes towards the People's Republic of China, so ably furthered by Henry Kissinger. I doubt that any American President who did not have strong backing from American conservatives could have run such a high political risk. I also appreciated his management of the *détente* policy towards the Soviet Union. Both these initiatives contributed materially to an improvement in international relations at the time and their effect was quickly and beneficially evident at the United Nations.

I do not know where Nixon's input ended in these and other policies of his administration, and where Henry Kissinger's began. There was no doubt, however, of Kissinger's encompassing influence on American foreign policy during the first half of my tenure at the United Nations.

He also came to office as no friend of the United Nations, indeed as someone highly sceptical of its usefulness. He was certainly no believer in a universal world political order. Yet under the stress of the critical days of the October War of 1973, he began to understand how useful the United Nations could be. He recognized the constructive role the Security Council had played during the crisis and the way it quickly took action to send UN forces as a buffer between the belligerents. As he was fully aware, their prompt dispatch helped to avoid a direct military confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union.

The reasons for his success and influence are complex. First of all he is a very intelligent man, far above the average, and is aware of his skills. He is a well-trained scholar and historian. Because of his European and Jewish background he has a more specific understanding than many statesmen of

world history and the problems of the Middle East.

Even so, in world politics intelligence alone is not the determining factor. What counts is power. It is unrealistic to believe that the era of *Machtpolitik*, the politics of power, is over. The supreme quality of Henry Kissinger was that he had, and knew how to use, power in a productive fashion. In civilized discussion and negotiation he used this power in order to press the parties to accept the proposals he made. Without any bombast or threat, he conveyed to his partners in discussion that he represented the greatest power in the world and that if they did not use the opportunity he was offering, they would get nothing out of the whole exercise. A tough politician, he was able to convince most of his interlocutors that he was sincere and that he genuinely wanted a peaceful settlement; and he never shrank from the heart of the matter. He has an engaging sense of humour, and he never left anyone in any doubt as to where the bottom line in his position lay. His attitude was: 'If you want a solution, I shall go on'; otherwise he made it clear that he would return to Washington. His political power visibly grew with the downfall of Nixon during the Watergate scandal and, of course, afterwards during President Ford's short term in office. The limits which Nixon set on him in the early days of his governmental career became obvious to me in connection with the American bombing of the Vietnamese dykes. When I discussed my public criticism of the US air raids over the phone with Kissinger, he assured me that my statement was well understood and would not have any negative impact on my relations with the President. The next day, however, Nixon convened a special press conference vigorously rejecting my statement and calling me 'naive'.

Kissinger's Egyptian negotiating partner, Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi, whom I consider one of the best brains in the Arab world, later on blamed him for his 'tendency to manipulate people, his overbearing vanity and his determination to be at centre-stage'. But I personally had no reason to complain about him. Although I was fully aware that he was not in love with the UN, he regularly visited me in my office on the thirty-eighth floor, and made a point of giving joint press briefings after our meetings in front of the famous Chagall window in the UN lobby. Whatever he said on such occasions, I admired his skill in public relations.

Although the seventh special session of the UN Assembly – with Kissinger's thought-provoking speech – in 1975 introduced a greater degree of tolerance and understanding between the developing world and the industrialized nations, this encouraging start did not in itself guarantee a satisfactory outcome. There was still too much suspicion for anything like a complete meeting of minds to occur. I felt very strongly that this

favourable beginning must not be frittered away. Worried about the inertia that had characterized these negotiations, in the autumn of 1975 I sent private letters to Kissinger, Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa of Japan, and the Italian Foreign Minister, Mariano Rumor, in his capacity as a president of the European Economic Community, urging them to spare no effort to reach a consensus on the outstanding policy issues. Their replies, although phrased in general terms, were reassuring.

The major resolution that emerged from the seventh special session had been in effect a revision of the Declaration on the establishment of a New International Economic Order of the previous year. Covering most of the same ground, it was couched in a spirit of common effort by the two sides rather than in the peremptory demands of the original declaration and its accompanying programme of action. It stressed the need for greater co-operation between states and proposed 'concerted' action to achieve the goals of the new economic order.

One swallow does not make a summer. The deep-seated difference between North and South was not to be overcome between one month and the next. There was no adequate follow-up. In an attempt to get things moving, the focus of the North-South debate was shifted from the unwieldly General Assembly to a smaller group outside the United Nations – the Conference on International Economic Co-operation, consisting of twenty-seven representatives drawn from both sides, including seven members of OPEC. This body had been organized and convened on the initiative of Giscard d'Estaing and met in Paris. There were high hopes that it might bring about a breakthrough. I attended its initial phase in December 1975, but was soon obliged to come to the conclusion that it was faced with the same problems we had encountered in the United Nations and with the same uncompromising attitudes of the two sides.

The industrialized nations were interested primarily in discussing the energy problem but the developing countries insisted on linking it with general commodity, finance and development issues. The discussions dragged on for eighteen months, with relatively little to show for the effort. The basis was laid for a common fund to assist raw material producers and some money was made available for development programmes. The results were nevertheless meagre.

Ignoring for a moment the strict chronology of this book, I think it would be helpful here to recount later developments in the North-South dialogue. After the disappointing outcome of the Paris talks, the scene of action, if it can be called that, shifted back once more to the United Nations. Over the next few years the developing countries increasingly focused the Assembly's attention on what are called 'global negotiatons' covering the major aspects of economic co-operation and development.

During the last two years of my term of office, I made strenuous efforts to give these negotiations practical form. Working in formal and informal groups, the delegates to the General Assembly tried one expedient after another in search of a formula to enable further progress to be made.

The main thrust of the Third World countries was to attain their ends by seeking radical changes in the United Nations system as at present organized. Currently the levers of financial power lie in the hands of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), where the voting strength closely reflects economic and financial power. The South would like somehow to shift the venue of decision-making in these matters to the General Assembly, where they have the majority vote. In this they have been unsuccessful, since the specialized agencies concerned were created by separate treaties and are not subordinate to the United Nations. All the exhortations contained in the General Assembly resolutions adopted on these subjects have, by their ineffectiveness, only compounded the frustrations of the developing countries and the irritation of the developed.

I do not mean to imply that all the fault in these attitudes lies on one side. If the developing countries are too rigid in their approach, the industrialized nations have hardly responded with excessive generosity to the proposals of the impoverished South. Their official development aid lags far behind the levels they have themselves accepted as targets. They have been more inclined to stand pat on their negative response to the new international economic order than to make concrete and constructive counter-proposals.

When Rüdiger von Wechmar, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations, became President of the 1980 General Assembly, he made the effort to get a set of global negotiations under way as the central theme of his term of office. There was no one better suited to the task. Wechmar was a disciple of the former German Chancellor Willy Brandt, perhaps the leading Western protagonist of the Third World's development cause. Wechmar represented one of the West's most successful and prosperous countries, enjoying great influence in the counsels of the North.

It was towards the end of the General Assembly in 1980 that some of the leading representatives of the Third World, together with Rüdiger von Wechmar, visited me in my office in an atmosphere of despair, telling me that all their efforts to work out a compromise solution for global negotiations had failed. They referred to my good personal relations with President Jimmy Carter and asked me to intervene with him in order to get America's consent to the latest compromise proposals of the Group of 77. The timing was hardly auspicious. The presidential election was only a

few weeks away. Nevertheless I had a long telephone conversation with the President and asked him to take a good look at the proposals, bearing in mind that the developing countries believed that America was the major obstacle in the way of starting negotiations.

This the President said he would do, but he reminded me that it was a difficult period for him. He made three main points. First, he said, the United States could not accept anything that would give the United Nations General Assembly any sort of authority over the IMF, the World Bank or GATT. Second, we should bear in mind that the American Congress took a jaundiced view of the United Nations, so much so that he had serious problems in getting funds appropriated by the Congress for the American contribution. Thirdly, he remarked that because of being in an election campaign he had to be cautious. If we were not careful, our actions could become counter-productive, he warned. It was in the interests of the United Nations not to push him too far.

What alarmed me was that the emotions engendered by the strident demands of the Third World and the recalcitrance, if not indifference, of the West, were destroying the credit of the United Nations and might ultimately even tear it apart. This, I considered, would be a tragedy. Virtually every country in the West agreed in theory that the abyss yawning between the rich and the poor peoples was an evil to be combatted. They agreed also that the process of development would bring benefits to the North as well as to the South. If only both sides were guided by this underlying common interest, I felt that a dialogue could eventually produce at least partial results.

It was Willy Brandt himself who suggested a possible formula. As the head of a distinguished group of former statesmen, including Edward Heath of Great Britain and leading private citizens, he had been instrumental in drawing up an exhaustive, widely publicized report on the need to reorder North-South relations to meet the challenges of the new decade. It envisaged a global agreement resulting from a joint effort of political will and a high degree of trust among the negotiating partners, with a common conviction of mutual interest. An essential step in achieving this objective would be a summit meeting of some twenty world leaders, representative of the major groupings, to produce guidelines and a new impetus for future negotiations.

The former Chancellor came to see me in New York in February 1980 and handed me a copy of his Commission's report with a request to circulate it to all members. He asked me if I would organize the summit meeting envisaged. I was obliged to tell him that due to the lack of a mandate from any organ of the UN I could not act as the convenor of such a conference. Moreover, it was not for me to select the participants as I knew

out of my long experience that this would immediately lead to criticism by those who had not been invited. There would be irresistible pressure to expand the membership so broadly that it would lose focus and effectiveness. We then decided that we would select two co-chairmen for the conference, one from the North and the other from the South. Together they would choose the other participants.

Brandt asked me to proceed along these lines. Our initial choice for the co-chairman from the North was the Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. As his colleague from the South we decided to approach the President of Mexico, José Lopez Portillo, who had indicated his interest to us. Brandt also asked me to try to persuade the Soviet Union to attend the meeting, but I knew that this would be pointless. The Russians have never considered participating in multilateral economic aid programmes to developing countries. Nevertheless I did take up the matter with Gromyko during my Moscow visit in June 1981. He answered at once that they were not interested and would not attend. I attempted to stress how useful a Soviet contribution to the North-South dialogue would be. Gromyko retorted by insisting that the problems facing the Third World in the economic sphere were the result of colonialism. The Soviet Union had never been a colonial power and had no reason to get involved in the consequences of Western imperialism. 'It is up to them to make up for what they have done to the countries of the Third World,' he said. 'We shall not attend because we do not wish to be placed in the same category as the Western powers.' He did add that the Soviet Union would render economic help to the developing countries. 'We shall of course help them, but we shall do so on a bilateral basis.'

I thought that the easier task would be with my fellow-Austrian Bruno Kreisky, so I approached him first. We had a long talk together in Vienna and he responded positively, but with one reservation: 'I have to be sure that the main industrialized countries support me in this undertaking. I can't do it on my own,' he said. He consulted the Americans, the Germans and the French, and when they responded favourably he went ahead.

Lopez Portillo reacted immediately. As the successor to Luis Echeverría, who had played such a prominent part in the UN special assemblies on this issue, he was predisposed to take an active part, proposed Cancun as the meeting place and joined with Kreisky in issuing the invitations.

Only a few weeks before the conference was due to meet, Bruno Kreisky fell ill. The Austrian government, in consultation with Lopez Portillo and others, invited the Canadian Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, to replace him. Fortunately he was able to make himself available and was his usual forceful and effective self. I took part as representative of the United Nations and we foregathered in October 1981.

Instructive for us, and also for him, was the presence of President Reagan. This was his first major exposure to Third World leaders as a group and he told me before we dispersed that he had found it an educational experience. There were twenty-three delegations and the arrangements were both sumptuous and relaxed. The tables in the main conference hall were arranged in a huge circle. Reagan, in a short-sleeved shirt, was inevitably the centre of attention, with all the other participants watching him carefully to see whether he was prepared to yield on any of the points that were so freely made to him. He was exceedingly courteous and genial, but always tough on substance, and yielded very little. The main conference sessions never took on the form of negotiations but there were many bilateral talks in the surrounding offices and at the luncheons, dinners and social occasions, where careful organization ensured that no group was ever the same twice.

I was much impressed by the forcefulness and clarity with which Mrs Gandhi supported the views of her Third World colleagues. She was very outspoken, but always left the way open for some understanding between the main participants. She was a world leader of the highest quality and her recent assassination is a bitter tragedy for all those with the interests of international understanding at heart.

The Chinese delegation was led by their Prime Minister, Zhao Zi Yang. He gave the impression of being a technocrat and administrator rather than the repository of high-level political power. He has a warm and sympathetic personality and gets on well with Europeans. He is also very close to Deng Xiaoping, who comes from the south-western province of Sichuan, of which Zhao was at one time the governor.

During the conference he played a low-key role, listening more than speaking: an attitude which seemed to fit his character and the basic policy of the Peking government. The Chinese still regard themselves as an under-developed country belonging to the Third World, without any ambition to play the role of a major power. They admit publicly that it will take them a long time to catch up with the other main powers. They are far behind in technology and even in technical infrastructure. Their teeming millions are hard-working and one day they will catch up with the Western world and the Soviet Union, but not soon. In my own judgement it will take them several decades; in the meantime they try desperately to acquire know-how from the Western world. Their conflict with the Soviets continues. Whether this will change with the advent of Gorbachev is open to question.

There was a sharp exchange, in the course of the conference, between President Nyerere and Pierre Trudeau. Nyerere, who is never short of words, had launched into a lengthy intervention to establish that although

Tanzania was a socialist country it would welcome private investment. Trudeau was quick to respond. He asked the Tanzanian President whether he really thought that the Western nations would invest more in his country, knowing that sooner or later their investments would be jeopardized by government intervention. Nyerere and his Third World colleagues were momentarily nonplussed by the retort, but suddenly loud laughter broke out, not least from Nyerere himself, and the meeting went on to other matters.

Regrettably the conference did not lead to any major change in the running controversy over the demands of the less developed countries for a new economic order. True to form of summit meetings, Cancun was long on harmonious generalities but short on practical results. Like so many other top-level gatherings, it provided no opportunity for the hard slog of detailed bargaining which must precede any agreement on so complex and controversial a subject. The conference made no provision for following up on its pronouncements or for making a start on global negotiations. With the onset of the recession of the 1980s, the focus shifted to short-term measures needed to save the developing countries from economic collapse. Each side took note of the views of the other and referred the whole matter back to the United Nations, where new efforts of another kind will have to be made if the world is to be relieved of this fundamental and agonizing conflict.

In all the years of my professional life as a diplomat, I learned one basic truth: it is personalities more than anything else which influence the destiny of the world. Out of this conviction, right at the beginning of my term of office as Secretary General I started to visit as many world leaders as possible. These trips to nearly all the capitals of the globe offered me the welcome opportunity not only to meet these personalities, but also to grasp the political environment in which they had to operate. Coming myself from the industrialized North, I made it a particular point to cultivate the leaders of the Third World countries which had swollen the membership of the organization. As they achieved independence, the new political leaders were primarily concerned to establish their control domestically, but most of them quickly realized how valuable the United Nations could be to them. It gave them an international sounding board and a training ground for their officials in modern diplomacy. On their own, their international influence was limited, but united in their regional and non-aligned group they gained importance and sometimes dominated the work of the organization. There was a constant flow of heads of state and other leaders from the Third World countries to the regular annual sessions of the General Assembly. Jointly and individually, they left their mark.

I owe Marshal Tito a posthumous mention for his sturdily independent foreign policy, which established Yugoslavia as a non-aligned country. He always impressed me with his straightforwardness and his strong support for the United Nations. He was frequently critical of it, usually on the grounds that it was too inactive in international affairs and suffered from a lack of clout, but his approach was as constructive as it was frank.

We used to meet in New York and Belgrade and I was a frequent guest of his on the two-island complex of Brioni in the Adriatic off the Yugoslav coast. Under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the islands had been mosquito-ridden and uninhabited. An Austrian named Kuppelwieser had made them habitable. When Tito came to power, he had constructed handsome hotels and guest houses on the larger island and a residence for himself, surrounded by a beautiful garden, on the smaller. He lived very comfortably there, indulging in his various hobbies, which included a private zoo, where he kept a collection of exotic animals sent to him as gifts by foreign political leaders. His other hobby was to build household furniture in a small workshop set in the midst of vineyards he had himself planted. He was proud of his wines and made a point of serving them with fish caught in the surrounding waters.

Two factors influenced his views on foreign policy. The first was a deep fear of the Russians, particularly after the 1968 'Prague Spring' liberalization movement had been destroyed by Soviet forces. He used to tax us Austrians with what he described as our complacency in the face of the Soviet menace. 'You people are too naive,' he said. 'Don't believe that you are not in danger. I have had my experiences with the Russians. They are capable of doing anything.' He was insistent that we remained on our guard against a Soviet military thrust through Austria and south to the Dalmatian coast.

His second great foreign policy concern was to strengthen the structure of East-West *détente* and the Non-Aligned Movement, thus creating a global equilibrium as a foundation for peace. The last years of his life left him a deeply disappointed man. He witnessed a deterioration in superpower relationships and the erosion of non-alignment as it fell under the increasing influence of the more radical Third World states.

I last saw Tito in a guest house in Havana during the 1979 summit conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. He was obviously physically ill and also deeply depressed. He was particularly concerned over the election of Cuba to chair the meeting, although the host country at these conferences is normally granted that honour. As the more radical leaders established their predominance, Tito's dismay increased. He was deeply exercised as to how the Non-Aligned Movement could maintain its credibility if Cuba, with its close links to the Soviet Union, were its leader.

The Cubans are extremely active in both the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement, although I did not meet Fidel Castro personally until I paid an official visit to Havana in January 1979. He is a charismatic figure, with a strong and magnetic personality and quite an attractive spontaneity in his manner. Greeting me at the airport, he asked immediately: 'Do you want the usual diplomatic protocol, complete with receptions and social events, or would you prefer me to take you to some islands where we can have our talks in peace and quiet?'

There was only one answer to such a loaded question and it suited my own preference. We changed our clothes at a nearby guest house and flew by helicopter to the island of La Juventud a few miles to the south. This is where Castro maintains his education and paramilitary centre for young African students, principally from Angola, Mozambique and Namibia. The youngsters were all in uniform and went through their paces with enthusiasm.

Castro had organized a small dinner for my party with only his closest advisers present. After a general discussion on the international situation, he came to what was obviously uppermost in his mind, the state of relations between Cuba and the United States. He launched a bitter attack against the American administration for rejecting all his efforts to establish better contacts. The Americans were not even permitted to export medicines badly needed in Cuba and he had to seek them in Europe and elsewhere. He almost pleaded with me to use all my influence to persuade the American government and people that he really wanted good relations. I assured Castro that I would inform Washington of his views.

The following day we flew to his private island, which he called his 'little Brioni'. It is a lovely spot, although still primitive, and our talks took place on his yacht, which was tied up at a small dock. The business of the day was interrupted by a session of swimming and harpoon fishing, at which our host excelled. We observed that the group of security men who protected him were principally engaged in finding the largest shoals of fish.

As he sat on the edge of the boat, a steward approached with two glasses on a small silver tray, each filled with a dark liquid. Castro first took a sip from one glass, gargled heartily and spat the contents into the sea. Then he took the other glass and swallowed its contents before diving in. I was told later that the first contained Listerine and the other whisky. Apparently this was his manner of fortifying himself against the rigours of skin-diving.

However that may be, he caught several dozen red snappers and lobsters. He personally prepared lunch; it consisted mainly of the raw seafood garnished with lemon juice, which he insisted was the best way to eat it. I have frequently been willing to sacrifice my digestive system in the

interest of international understanding, but this went beyond my normal bounds. As I found out later, Fidel Castro's strange way of preparing raw lobster was not so bad after all. Friends of ours did it the same way in Connecticut and loved it.

As on the previous evening, our talks concentrated mainly on Cuban-American relations. If this seemed a case of dialectical overkill, there was doubtless a special reason for it. At Castro's insistence, Bradford Morse, the highly respected administrator of the UN Development Programme, had been invited to all our functions for general discussions and to celebrate the opening of a new sugar mill built with the help of his organization.

Morse was a former American Congressman, well connected in Washington, and Castro doubtless wanted to use him as an additional channel to get his message through to the administration. Morse handled the situation very well.

On our departure Castro noticed my small rented aircraft standing on the airport apron. It was an old and somewhat shabby-looking Falcon, with space for only nine people. Professing astonishment, he asked me with disbelief in his voice: 'Are you going back in that thing? Is it safe enough?' I assured him that it was and that in any event I had no choice. The United Nations does not possess its own aeroplane for the Secretary General or anyone else. It rents and charters the planes it uses. I consoled myself with the thought that, if my dignity had been impaired, I might at least have convinced Castro and his revolutonary comrades of the capitalist frugality of the UN organization.

One figure in the Third World merits special respect: King Hussein of Jordan. I visited him on many occasions and was always impressed by the blend of shrewdness, wisdom and courage which he displayed. Small in stature, precise and careful in speech, he has survived the turmoil besetting his country from outside as well as from its large and unruly Palestinian elements within. He combines courage with cautious diplomacy. A highly intelligent man, he supports a Western style of life while maintaining deep roots in Moslem traditions. Experience has taught him the value of prudence. As a young boy, he saw his father assassinated by Palestinian extremists while standing on the steps of a mosque in Jerusalem. His engagement in the Six-Day War of 1967 cost him Arab Jerusalem and his territory on the West Bank of the Jordan. These were hard lessons indeed.

His reluctance to respond to Western proposals that he should negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians should come as no surprise. He can only do so with the approval of the other Arab states. His *rapprochement* with Arafat

and his joint approach to President Mubarek clearly show were his aspirations lie. Mubarek supports Hussein's policies to the best of his abilities, but he too must be wary of provoking his fundamentalists. The joint endeavours to involve Washington actively in the peace process and to negotiate with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation have met with considerable American reserve. For his part, President Reagan is facing a strong Israeli lobby which seeks to thwart all contact with the PLO. It is also no surprise that Muhammad Gaddafi should reject Hussein's proposals.

I received repeated invitations from Colonel Gaddafi to visit him in Libya. It was always one of my problems to visit certain countries at the right time, because such personal encounters are immediately interpreted by the international media as a gesture of support for this or that government. In the case of Gaddafi – whom I met in August 1977 in Tripoli – it was particularly delicate because of his alleged support of terrorist activities. When I brought this up with him, he reacted sharply and indignantly. It was absolutely untrue, he said, that he was supporting international terrorism. All he did and would continue to do was to support liberation movements, which had, he asserted, even under the UN Charter, the right to fight for their independence. That could be done without acts of terrorism. When I left Gaddafi one simple thought again came to my mind: as long as there is no objective distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters, it will always be left to governments and people to make their own subjective assessment. Nevertheless I always find it important to keep contact with all political leaders whatever their ideology and public image may be. It does not help to create a group of political outcasts when one day their co-operation may be needed to solve an international problem.

President Houari Boumédienne of Algeria and I had several encounters over the economic demands of the Third World and the plight of Polisario hostages on his border. He was not an easy man to deal with but I managed to establish good relations with him and he was quite co-operative. He was highly critical of the attitudes of the industrialized nations and known for his tough, rigid approach in the negotiations on the new economic order.

Boumédienne was equally at odds with his neighbour, King Hassan of Morocco, whose army had taken over the former Spanish colony of the Western Sahara. The Algerian President had reacted violently, accusing King Hassan of imperialism. The territory was so sparsely populated that neither the Spanish records, the Algerians, the Moroccans nor the UN were ever able to determine exactly how many people lived there. The best guess was between eighty and one hundred thousand, predominantly

nomads, among whom it would have been almost impossible to conduct a referendum to determine their political future.

King Hassan was equally intransigent and almost as difficult to deal with. His firm position that the former Spanish Sahara was an integral part of Morocco – rejecting all claims of the liberation movement Polisario for an independent state – created a deep division within the OAU. When, in 1984, Polisario was admitted under the name 'Arab Democratic Republic of Sahrawi' as a full member to the OAU, Morocco and her friends left the organization, creating a most serious crisis for the OAU. On one visit I had great difficulty in obtaining an appointment with the King. So I indicated to his staff that I wished to present him with the United Nations peace medal, a gold medallion which I made a practice of giving to all the Heads of State I visited during my term of office. The King received me the following morning. He also invited me to join him in the royal train, in which, as it turned out, he was making a tour to mobilize public opinion as part of the 'green march' designed to annex the Spanish Sahara. This placed me in an entirely false position, but fortunately there were no unpleasant repercussions.

The chief victim of this unhappy dispute was the President of Mauritania, Mr Moktar Ould Daddah, who had been persuaded by the Moroccans to occupy the southern part of the territory abandoned by the Spaniards. Daddah was a modest-looking man, educated in France and married to a French lady whose hobby was writing books for children. His official residence had such limited facilities that his reception and dinner for me took place in a tent put up in the garden. We squatted on cushions cross-legged and were served with the traditional racks of lamb, although I managed to avoid eating the eyes when they were served. The Sahara situation was clearly beyond his control and the Polisario liberation units continuously attacked the fragile forces of the Mauritanian army. After a number of palace revolutions Ould Daddah was deposed in a bloodless coup and the Mauritanian government had to surrender its claim to the Western Sahara in 1979.

Much happier were my relationships with two outstanding African leaders, President Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal and President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. Both are highly cultivated men, former members of the French National Assembly and experienced statesmen. Their influence in the shaping of African policies towards the former colonial powers was of greatest importance. Senghor is a philosopher and poet of international standing and Houphouët-Boigny one of the wisest men the African continent has produced. Defenders of the free market economy, their countries were among the more prosperous nations in Africa.

Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia is another African leader of great stature. His honesty and personal warmth have created many friends in the United Nations and in the world at large. He is a strong defender of the continent's interests and a determined opponent of South Africa's apartheid policies. He is also a very religious man. At a dinner party during my first official visit, in 1973, he turned to me and asked: 'Are you a Protestant or a Catholic?' I was somewhat surprised by the question and must have shown it, because he went on: 'I have two priests here at the table, one Catholic and one Protestant, to say grace but I have to know on whom I should call.'

Dignity and protocol were not always maintained during these trips. Although it is some time ago now, I cannot forget a visit I paid to Kenya in the summer of 1974 to see President Kenyatta. I was informed that he would receive me in the small village of Nakuru, some way from the capital, where he was opening the agricultural fair. I was flown there in a special aircraft and arrived in the middle of the ceremony. Prizes were being given to the best bulls, and tribal dancers then filled the arena. Suddenly Kenyatta turned to me and asked whether I would like to join him in congratulating them. I saw no harm in this and accompanied him into their midst, where, after a few exchanges, he took me by the hand and suggested we join the dance. This aroused universal enthusiasm and applause but I could not help asking myself whether it had been a worthwhile visit when, instead of having political talks with Kenyatta, I ended up in a cattle show dancing with him.

Perhaps my most embarrassing experience was at Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso. This was part of a tour of the drought-stricken Sahel region – stretching from Senegal in the west to Ethiopia and Somalia in the east – which I undertook in February 1974. My itinerary included seventeen countries in an attempt to co-ordinate the UN emergency relief operation for tens of thousands who were starving. The co-ordinating committee had been summoned to his modest capital by President Lamizana and it was planned that I should go on to the balcony of his official residence to make an appeal to the international community for further help to these stricken people. Television and radio were in attendance and even before leaving New York I had prepared a dramatic plea to read out to the thousands of people I had been promised would be standing in the square in front of the palace. When we got out on to the balcony there was not a soul to be seen. I turned to the President, asking for an explanation. It soon became clear that the minister in charge of the event had forgotten to make any public announcement of my speech and therefore no one had turned up. In order to salvage something from the occasion I recorded my address for subsequent use.

What would appear to be yet another example of Third World governments in disarray is in fact merely symptomatic of a much more profound and complicated problem common to all developing countries. It is all too easy to blame them for their lack of experience and absence of infrastructure, but that only detracts from the root cause of the developing countries' present plight. The economic, political, social and cultural problems confronting the developing countries are legion; equally divergent are the means for overcoming hunger, poverty and injustice that are put forward by the members of the UN in their endeavours to support the development of the Third World. In the final analysis, all development models are part and parcel of specific social models. Having seen and heard a plethora of programmes and concepts during my ten years of office, I see no merit in adding to the confusion by bringing forward new proposals. To my mind, and based on my experience, certain basic principles hold true and must be subscribed to if any long-term development strategy is to succeed:

> Hitherto, development aid, both in its conception and in its implementation, has adhered to foreign models; such an approach was doomed, since it made no allowance for those features peculiar to society in the developing countries. The education system propagated in most developing countries, for example, does not meet real social needs. Illiteracy rates are still climbing because most developing countries have not been able to introduce primary education on a general scale. Higher education is often seen as a sign of social achievement, a kind of status symbol, while technical education and vocational training are still not considered priorities. A new educational system suited to the specific needs of the individual countries is a major factor in socio-economic development and should be recognized as such.
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> Self-reliance is a deeply rooted tradition in the developing countries; it offers a firm basis on which sensible aid programmes can be developed. For example, a plan of action oriented towards the achievement of self-sufficiency in food should be the guiding principle for all international efforts to combat famine and starvation, particularly in Africa.
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> Most developing countries can be seen to be suffering from an identity crisis which takes on the form of bitter and sometimes violent attempts to reassert their cultural identity. Unfortunately, this particular issue is sometimes taken as a pretext for diverting public attention away from pressing day-to-day problems, and it is sometimes exploited for purely ideological reasons. In shaping aid

programmes and promoting economic co-operation, the international community should recognize the aspirations of the individual countries and foster their traditional values. Approached from this angle, a country's assertion of its cultural heritage will proceed within the right context, rather than be debased to a mere political slogan.

The gap between rural and urban areas is forever widening: development, services and infrastructure are wanting in rural areas, with the result that the unending waves of urban immigration give rise to awesome conurbations and new social problems. Rural development should thus take on priority in any development plan. The absence of planned infrastructure incurs a wastage of valuable resources and under-utilization of machinery and equipment. Steps should thus be taken on an international scale to assist the developing countries in building up the infrastructure needed to absorb new technologies and subsequently to adapt them to prevailing conditions.

National security is a major concern in the developing countries, whose independence is for the most part still young. Unfortunately, in their search for external and internal security the majority of them fall within the super-powers' sphere of influence. Given this situation, an atmosphere of relative peace and security conducive to development is one of the most important preconditions for improving the living standards of the poor nations.

As I write, the North-South issue is as far from resolution as ever. The recovery of the industrialized states from the most recent recession has been uneven and precarious. Most of the poorest developing countries, and even many of those more prosperous, are in dire straits, while a number of them are weighed down by onerous debt burdens and high interest rates. The quest for a new international economic order has perforce given way to more immediate, practical concerns. Developed and developing countries alike are striving to prevent massive defaults on international loans, and an increasing mood of protectionism is jeopardizing international markets.

In a crisis situation emergency measures are required. But deep-seated maladjustments and persistent world economic difficulties call for longer-term solutions. If world prosperity is to be restored on a sustainable basis, all concerned must take responsible and concerted action: North and South, market and centrally-planned economies, oil-exporting and oil-importing countries, governments, international organizations and the private sector, including the banks. Only through the co-ordinated efforts

of all these institutions shall we be able to shake off our present difficulties and advance anew.

However necessary and however beneficial the spontaneous raising of funds throughout the world may be in terms of saving the lives of hundreds of thousands in Africa and Asia, it has nothing to do with the kind of development policy under discussion here. Long-term development aid should in no way be considered a form of charity to any country. It should be based on enlightened self-interest in the industrialized countries. The recognition of global economic interdependence, which has emerged particularly in the past decade, has established a direct and strong link between the developed and the developing world.

Whereas the South needs help to help itself if it is to overcome hunger and misery, the North needs the markets and purchasing power of the South. The prosperity of the Third World is, therefore, ineluctably linked to global trade. If trade expands, the world economy expands. Moreover, I cannot foresee international security being firmly established for generations to come as long as islands of wealth persist in a sea of world poverty. The basic truth remains – neither side can prosper without the other.

Step Two

major crisis area of the continent. I have no doubt that their policy of racial discrimination will one day collapse. The white man has long realized, despite his fear of annihilation, that he cannot do away with his black compatriots. The black population has long been aware that the white man is not a colonialist in South Africa but has the right to live there. A genuine dialogue is crucial, and both sides must recognize that they need each other. I hope it is not too late for the necessary revolution of the spirit.

will one day collapse.

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The New Majority

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During the whole of the seventies, when I was Secretary-General, world attention focused mainly on wars, conflicts and international crises and on how these were dealt with by the United Nations. Unfortunately this led to a misconception about the work of the world organization. Since the attitudes of the member governments very often did not permit the UN to discharge its duties as foreseen in the Charter, the image of the United Nations deteriorated. Although I fully recognize the importance of the political role of the organization, during my term of office I was faced with a new challenge, the handling of a new phenomenon, namely the growing gap between the rich countries in the North and the poor countries in the South of the globe.

In a world which had not really taken note of the historic dimension of this dramatic awakening in the Third World, the United Nations was the one single place where these forces could express themselves and mobilise the community of nations to draw attention to their plight.

The influx of newly independent countries radically altered the entire character of the United Nations. This massive group of Third World nations was not beholden to the West, it was encouraged, but not controlled, by the Soviet bloc. Its leaders proved highly adept at establishing operational groupings within the organization. In addition to continental and regional groups, they formed two over-arching organizations that included the vast majority of United Nations membership. In the political sphere, the Non-Aligned Movement was designed to function as a third force which could remain aloof from East-West alliances and manoeuvres. Their founding fathers were Tito, Nehru and Nasser, together with the Indonesian President Sukarno. A parallel organization, the 'Group of 77' (actually, now over 125 states), was set up in order to advance the economic and social development of its membership. Each of these groups met periodically to concert strategy and tactics. Their

A world

cohesion has remained remarkable, in spite of the fact that they include a number of oil-rich developing countries. This has failed to disturb their common front.

These overlapping coalitions now include virtually all the non-white, non-Western states in Asia and Africa, the bulk of the countries in South America and even a few Soviet allies such as Cuba, Vietnam and the Mongolian People's Republic. They have transformed the parliamentary structure of the United Nations. Bloc politics tends to dominate decision-making. The new majority of the Third World overwhelms the out-numbered West-East-West rivalries, while still predominant in global terms, have become relatively less prominent in United Nations affairs.

The goals of these new members are egalitarian. The bulk of the wealth, scientific and technological skills, educational talent and productive capacity in the world is concentrated in a relatively few states. As long as this continues, the anti-colonial revolution, in the eyes of the less developed countries, cannot be considered complete.

On their own, most of these countries could do little to make their case persuasively. But in the United Nations, where all states enjoy the same voting rights, the situation is different. By joining forces, the smaller states can, within broad limits, control most of the decisions. To be sure, the word 'decisions' is, in most cases, a misnomer. In the General Assembly there are only recommendations, without binding effect. Even so they are not to be ignored, and over the course of time are bound to influence thought and action.

In order to facilitate the development process, the General Assembly created in 1964 the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Three years later the UN Assembly established the UN Industrial Development Organization to assist the developing countries. It is now in the process of becoming a fully fledged specialized agency of the UN with its own separately funded budget.

Both the agenda and the membership of the world organization were evolving in a way not foreseen by its founding fathers. It soon became apparent that what the new Third World majority was seeking was nothing less than a revolution in the world economy, to be won less by coercion than by the power of persuasion in the international forum. They demanded fairness and justice: fairness because they did not accept that three-quarters of the world's population living in the under-developed countries should enjoy only one-fifth of its gross income; justice because, in their eyes, the old colonial powers had gained their wealth by exploiting the peoples and resources of their former possessions. To redress the balance they should now agree to a massive transfer of resources to the countries of the south.

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These had indeed been examples in post-war history of such acts of enlightened self-interest as the Marshall Plan, the American Alliance for Progress, and European Community arrangements for economic assistance to their former African, Caribbean and Pacific territories under the Lomé Conventions. These programmes had one feature in common: they combined economic aid with the strengthening of alliances, or at least enhanced political affinity.

In contrast, the demands the Third World countries made on the Western industrialized states offered no comparable rewards. Their more radical leaders seldom based their claims in the context of mutual benefits. They spoke of the redressing of wrongs, and economic and social development, not as an aspiration but as a right to which they were entitled. It was an approach which produced confrontation rather than accommodation of views. The Third World could not achieve its purposes without the participation of the industrialized states they were attacking. The result of this policy in the United Nations was chronic acrimony and frustration.

One group, the bloc of Marxist states, stood largely aloof from the whole debate. The Soviet Union and its supporters, and also China, regarded development as a responsibility of the former colonial powers. They supported the argument that it was for the Western countries to compensate the developing nations for the exploitation to which they had been subjected in an earlier era. The Marxist countries hardly participated in the multilateral development activities of the UN. They preferred to pursue their own bilateral aid programmes.

Obviously, the industrialized countries were reluctant to accept blanket liability for the alleged evils of colonialism and imperialism. They were willing to make adjustments in existing institutions and practices to meet the pressing needs of the South, but the improvements they proposed were incremental rather than radical. They insisted that economic development was a complex and lengthy process. They refused to – as they put it – give money and credit, machinery, infrastructure and technical assistance to countries lacking the personnel, organization and experience to absorb them.

It must be said that they did not have to look far to find instances of the failure of ill-considered development projects, or examples of lack of co-ordination among donor agencies and waste and corruption among the recipients. The cost of major aid programmes was high. To grant trade preferences or guarantee higher prices for raw materials, or to extend financial aid on concessionary terms, involved a real cost to the industries, consumers and tax payers of the developed countries. They preferred to rely, as far as possible on market forces to increase the productive capacity

of the poorer nations.

Both personally and in terms of my constitutional position, I felt considerable sympathy for the basic position of the South. In all good conscience, nations which had subscribed to the UN Charter's pursuit of 'better standards of life in larger freedom' could not stand passively by in the face of massive poverty, hunger, ill health and illiteracy. The disparity between the two worlds was not diminishing but to a considerable extent increasing. Remedial action was necessary, and in my judgement it could only be carried out on a world scale if the UN organization participated in a major way. The facts were incontrovertible. In the North, one fourth of the world's population possessed more than nine tenths of its manufacturing industry and received more than four fifths of its income. In the South, more than 1.2 billion people lived in countries with a gross national product averaging less than $250 per head per year.

Realistically, however, the process could not be a 'one way street'. Whatever the help from outside, a critical factor in development would be the self reliant effort of the countries in the south themselves.

Nothing would be accomplished if the two sides dug in on extreme positions and used the United Nations to launch verbal broadsides at each other. I therefore devoted myself to a search for areas of agreement, the advocacy of moderation and gradualism and the continuation of a dialogue between the parties.

When I assumed office the industrial world was ending a decade of exceptional growth. The UN had established an 'international development strategy' to set economic targets, and while the major industrialized nations had expressed some reservations, they had endorsed the general principle of moving by co-operation towards a more just and rational world economic and social order. The decade of the seventies was one of sharp and painful economic adjustments. The system of fixed exchange rates created by the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 had collapsed and, in 1973/4, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ended the era of cheap energy by quadrupling the price of oil. These events shook the world economic system, but their weight fell most heavily on the poorest countries, which lacked the reserves and productive resources to cope. Even the richer nations went into recession, resulting in a combination of inflation and unemployment.

The oil shock galvanized the more outspoken leaders of the Group of 77. They saw that their oil rich brothers had wrested control of their natural resources from the multinational corporations. They had sharply reversed the adverse terms of trade from which the former colonial territories habitually suffered. The invulnerability of the North had been challenged and the other developing countries, particularly those with other market-

able assets, hoped to make comparable gains.

Under the leadership of President Houari Boumédienne of Algeria, at that time the head of the non-aligned group, they called for a special session of the General Assembly in April 1974 'with a view to establishing a new system of relations based on equality and the common interests of all states'. Boumédienne was peremptory, proclaiming the failure of the international development strategy and attributing this to the lack of political will on the part of the developed countries to take the required urgent action, and the inadequacy of the growth targets in relation to the real needs of the South.

He sustained this combative tone in the conversation we had at the outset of this sixth special session in New York. The real issue, he said, was economic domination of the poor by the rich. The Third World now had real bargaining power by virtue of their natural resources. In order to avoid confrontation, both sides should initiate a responsible dialogue. The industrialized nations would have to change their policies and demonstrate a political will to co-operate. What his group hoped for from the Assembly was nothing less than the forging of a new international economic order.

He insisted that the position of the United States would be particularly significant. I told him that I knew from my contacts in Washington that the American administration was taking a passive attitude towards the special session. For my own part I felt that the US must participate actively in the work of the session if it was to have any meaning. It would become highly undesirable for them to be isolated in the Assembly, and I persuaded them to assume a more active role. At the same time I advised Boumédienne to seek a constructive compromise.

The special session in 1974 was not to be guided by counsels of moderation. It adopted a resolution providing for fundamental changes in the entire structure of international economic relations, including provisions on commodities, trade and industrialization, natural resources, food, finance and multinational corporations. The countries of the North were not prepared to respond in depth to these far reaching proposals. They did not vote against the resulting 'Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New Economic Order', but they made it clear through numerous reservations that they would not comply.

At the regular Assembly session the following autumn, the same adversarial spirit prevailed. This time the Group of 77 united behind a proposed 'Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States' which had been drafted by President Luis Echeverría of Mexico. This declared that every state had 'the sovereign and inalienable right' to choose its own economic, political, social and cultural systems without any outside interference and should exercise 'full permanent sovereignty' over its

wealth, natural resources and economic activities. The developing nations were to have the sole right to decide for themselves the terms for compensating expropriated foreign enterprises.

These demands brought North-South relations in the organization to a new low. Most of the larger industrialized countries resented the verbal attacks and far-reaching demands of the majority. They were unwilling to abandon the existing economic system. If additional aid was to be made available for development, the countries of the North would have to provide most of it. As oil importers they were already making a massive transfer of financial resources to the OPEC countries and they now demanded that these should share in any major programmes to assist those less developed. The session ended in disarray.

The developing countries dismissed the proposal put forward by the West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, that instead of the same old long catalogue of impossible demands they should draw up a list of the things they wanted in some order of priority so that negotiations could start. The representatives of the Third World alone rejected it as patchwork politics where radical action was needed.

Nevertheless, as the months passed, as a result of constant interchanges at the UN passions cooled and more moderate views emerged. A seventh special session of the General Assembly was held in the first half of September 1975. The contrast with its predecessor was remarkable. The developed countries, and particularly the United States, had evidently decided that a purely negative posture would help neither party. In a highlight speech the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, put forward a number of promising proposals in a spirit of reconciliation. Kissinger had begun to recognise the usefulness of the UN for Washington's foreign policies and obviously wanted to make a gesture to reduce Third World scepticism towards the United States.

He outlined a broad range of new international machinery, with offers of additional financial resources in response to the developing countries' needs in the fields of commodities, trade, finance, industrialization and food production. Others adopted a similarly conciliatory tone and an intensive effort began to reach common ground. The special session reached its conclusions by consensus and its work contributed to an improvement of economic relations between North and South.

In all candour I would have to admit that the promise of the seventh special session has not been realised in anything like the form then envisaged.

It was the merit of Henry Kissinger that the relationship between the United Nations and the Nixon administration, which had previously been

overshadowed by the controversy over Vietnam, improved progressively, although Nixon himself remained in the background. My relations with the President had been ambivalent. During my first year of office I had put out a public statement concerning the alleged American bombing of the dykes around Hanoi. I appealed on humanitarian grounds to cease operations that led to so much suffering. President Nixon had reacted in sharp tones. The Vietnam War was becoming extremely unpopular and doubtless my intervention was unwelcome, particularly in the period leading up to his second election. Thereafter our contacts remained distinctly cool and distant.

He gave an official luncheon for me at the White House but although we met several times there was never an in-depth exchange of views on world problems. He had little regard for the United Nations. However, I am obliged to say that as to his views and actions in the field of foreign policy one could not but appreciate his knowledge, vision and skill. Of the four presidents with whom I have dealt, he was the best prepared for his diplomatic responsibilities.

I particularly admired the way in which he managed the opening up of American attitudes towards the People's Republic of China, so ably furthered by Henry Kissinger. I doubt that any American President who did not have strong backing from American conservatives could have run such a high political risk. I also appreciated his management of the *détente* policy towards the Soviet Union. Both these initiatives contributed materially to an improvement in international relations at the time and their effect was quickly and beneficially evident at the United Nations.

I do not know where Nixon's input ended in these and other policies of his administration, and where Henry Kissinger's began. There was no doubt, however, of Kissinger's encompassing influence on American foreign policy during the first half of my tenure at the United Nations.

He also came to office as no friend of the United Nations, indeed as someone highly sceptical of its usefulness. He was certainly no believer in a universal world political order. Yet under the stress of the critical days of the October War of 1973, he began to understand how useful the United Nations could be. He recognized the constructive role the Security Council had played during the crisis and the way it quickly took action to send UN forces as a buffer between the belligerents. As he was fully aware, their prompt dispatch helped to avoid a direct military confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union.

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The reasons for his success and influence are complex. First of all he is a very intelligent man, far above the average, and is aware of his ability. He is a well-trained scholar and historian. Because of his European and Jewish background he has a more specific understanding than many statesmen of

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world history and the problems of the Middle East. world

Even so Even so, in world politics intelligence alone is not the determining factor. What counts is power. It is unrealistic to believe that the era of *Machtpolitik*, the politics of power, is over. The supreme quality of Henry Kissinger was that he had, and knew how to use, power in a productive fashion. In civilized discussion and negotiation he used this power in order to press the parties to accept the proposals he made. Without any bombast or threat, he conveyed to his partners in discussion that he represented the the world greatest power in the world and that if they did not use the opportunity he was offering, they would get nothing out of the whole exercise. A tough politician, he was able to convince most of his interlocutors that he was sincere and that he genuinely wanted a peaceful settlement, and he never has to go on shrank from the heart of the matter. He has an engaging sense of humour, and he never left anyone in any doubt as to where the bottom line in his position lay. His attitude was: 'If you want a solution, I shall go on'; otherwise he made it clear that he would return to Washington. His political power visibly grew with the downfall of Nixon during the Watergate scandal and, of course, afterwards during President Ford's short term in office. The limits which Nixon set on him in the early days of his governmental career became obvious to me in connection with the American bombing of the Vietnamese dykes. When I discussed my public criticism of the US air raids over the phone with Kissinger, he assured me that my statement was well understood and would not have any negative impact on my relations with the President. The next day, however, Nixon convened a special press conference vigorously rejecting my statement and calling me 'naive'.

Kissinger's Egyptian negotiating partner, Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi, whom I consider one of the best brains in the Arab world, later on blamed him for his 'tendency to manipulate people, his overbearing vanity, and his determination to be at centre stage'. But I personally had no To complain reason to complain about him. Although I was fully aware that he was not in love with the UN, he regularly visited me in my office on the thirty-eighth floor, and made a point of giving joint press briefings after our meetings in Chagall window front of the famous Chagall window in the UN lobby. Whatever he said on such occasions, I admired his skill in public relations.

Although the seventh special session of the UN Assembly, with Kissinger's thought-provoking speech in 1975, introduced a greater degree of tolerance and understanding between the developing world and the industrialized nations, this encouraging start did not in itself guarantee a satisfactory outcome. There was still too much suspicion for anything like a complete meeting of minds to occur. I felt very strongly that this

favourable beginning must not be frittered away. Worried about the inertia that had characterized these negotiations, in the autumn of 1975 I sent private letters to Kissinger, Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa of Japan, and the Italian Foreign Minister, Mariano Rumor, in his capacity as a president of the European Economic Community, urging them to spare no effort to reach a consensus on the outstanding policy issues. Their replies, although phrased in general terms, were reassuring.

The major resolution that emerged from the seventh special session had been in effect a revision of the Declaration on the establishment of a New International Economic Order of the previous year. Covering most of the same ground, it was couched in a spirit of common effort by the two sides rather than in the peremptory demands of the original declaration and its accompanying programme of action. It stressed the need for greater co-operation between states and proposed 'concerted' action to achieve the goals of the new economic order.

does not make a difference

One swallow does not make a summer. The deep-seated difference between North and South was not to be overcome between one month and the next. There was no adequate follow-up. In an attempt to get things moving, the focus of the North–South debate was shifted from the unwieldly General Assembly to a smaller group outside the United Nations – the Conference on International Economic Co-operation, consisting of twenty-seven representatives drawn from both sides, including seven members of OPEC. This body had been organized and convened on the initiative of Giscard d'Estaing and met in Paris. There were high hopes that it might bring about a breakthrough. I attended its initial phase in December 1975, but was soon obliged to come to the conclusion that it was faced with the same problems we had encountered in the United Nations and with the same uncompromising attitudes of the two sides.

The industrialized nations were interested primarily in discussing the energy problem but the developing countries insisted on linking it with general commodity, finance and development issues. The discussions dragged on for eighteen months, with relatively little to show for the effort. The basis was laid for a common fund to assist raw material producers and some money was made available for development programmes. The results were nevertheless meagre.

Ignoring for a moment the strict chronology of this book, I think it would be helpful here to recount later developments in the North–South dialogue. After the disappointing outcome of the Paris talks, the scene of action, if it can be called that, shifted back once more to the United Nations. Over the next few years the developing countries increasingly focused the Assembly's attention on what are called 'global negotiations' covering the major aspects of economic co-operation and development.

... world. Even so, the world has to go on. To complain about love in front of the famous Chagall window does not make a difference.

During the last two years of my term of office, I made strenuous efforts to give these negotiations practical form. Working in formal and informal groups, the delegates to the General Assembly tried one expedient after another in search of a formula to enable further progress to be made.

The main thrust of the Third World countries was to attain their ends by seeking radical changes in the United Nations system as at present organized. Currently the levers of financial power lie in the hands of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), where the voting strength closely reflects economic and financial power. The South would like somehow to shift the venue of decision making in these matters to the General Assembly, where they have the majority vote. In this they have been unsuccessful, since the specialized agencies concerned were created by separate treaties and are not subordinate to the United Nations. All the exhortations contained in the General Assembly resolutions adopted on these subjects have, by their ineffectiveness, only compounded the frustrations of the developing countries and the irritation of the developed.

I do not mean to imply that all the fault in these attitudes lies on one side. If the developing countries are too rigid in their approach, the industrialized nations have hardly responded with excessive generosity to the proposals of the impoverished South. Their official development aid lags far behind the levels they have themselves accepted as targets. They have been more inclined to stand pat on their negative response to the new international economic order than to make concrete and constructive counter-proposals.

When Rüdiger von Wechmar, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations, became President of the 1980 General Assembly, he made the effort to get a set of global negotiations under way as the central theme of his term of office. There was no one better suited to the task. Wechmar was a disciple of the former German Chancellor Willy Brandt, perhaps the leading Western protagonist of the Third World's development cause. Wechmar represented one of the West's most successful and prosperous countries, enjoying great influence in the councils of the North.

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It was towards the end of the General Assembly in 1980 that some of the leading representatives of the Third World, together with Rüdiger von Wechmar, visited me in my office in an atmosphere of despair, telling me that all their efforts to work out a compromise solution for global negotiations had failed. They referred to my good personal relations with President Jimmy Carter and asked me to intervene with him in order to get America's consent to the latest compromise proposals of the Group of 77. The timing was hardly auspicious. The presidential election was only a

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few weeks away. Nevertheless I had a long telephone conversation with the President and asked him to take a good look at the proposals, bearing in mind that the developing countries believed that America was the major obstacle in the way of starting negotiations.

This the President said he would do, but he reminded me that it was a difficult period for him. He made three main points. First, he said, the United States could not accept anything that would give the United Nations General Assembly any sort of authority over the IMF, the World Bank or GATT. Second, we should bear in mind that the American Congress took a jaundiced view of the United Nations, so much so that he had serious problems in getting funds appropriated by the Congress for the American contribution. Thirdly, he remarked that because of being in an election campaign he had to be cautious. If we were not careful, our actions could become counter-productive, he warned. It was in the interests of the United Nations not to push him too far.

What alarmed me was that the emotions engendered by the strident demands of the Third World and the recalcitrance, if not indifference, of the West, were destroying the credit of the United Nations and might ultimately even tear it apart. This, I considered, would be a tragedy. Virtually every country in the West agreed in theory that the abyss yawning between the rich and the poor peoples was an evil to be combatted. They agreed also that the process of development would bring benefits to the North as well as to the South. If only both sides were guided by this underlying common interest, I felt that a dialogue could eventually produce at least partial results.

It was Willy Brandt himself who suggested a possible formula. As the head of a distinguished group of former statesmen, including Edward Heath of Great Britain and leading private citizens, he had been instrumental in drawing up an exhaustive, widely publicized report on the need to re-order North-South relations to meet the challenges of the new decade. It envisaged a global agreement resulting from a joint effort of political will and a high degree of trust among the negotiating partners, with a common conviction of mutual interest. An essential step in achieving this objective would be a summit meeting of some twenty world leaders, representative of the major groupings, to produce guide-lines and a new impetus for future negotiations.

The former Chancellor came to see me in New York in February 1980 and handed me a copy of his Commission's report with a request to circulate it to all members. He asked me if I would organize the summit meeting envisaged. I was obliged to tell him that due to the lack of a mandate from any organ of the UN I could not act as the convener of such a conference. Moreover, it was not for me to select the participants as I knew

out of my long experience that this would immediately lead to criticism by those who had not been invited. There would be irresistible pressure to expand the membership so broadly that it would lose focus and effectiveness. We then decided that we would select two co-chairmen for the conference, one from the North and the other from the South. Together they would choose the other participants.

Brandt asked me to proceed along these lines. Our initial choice for the co-chairman from the North was the Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. As his colleague from the South we decided to approach the President of Mexico, José Lopez Portillo, who had indicated his interest to us. Brandt also asked me to try to persuade the Soviet Union to attend the meeting, but I knew that this would be pointless. The Russians have never considered participating in multilateral economic aid programmes to developing countries. Nevertheless I did take up the matter with Gromyko during my Moscow visit in June 1981. He answered at once that they were not interested and would not attend. I attempted to stress how useful a Soviet contribution to the North-South dialogue would be. Gromyko retorted by insisting that the problems facing the Third World in the economic sphere were the result of colonialism. The Soviet Union had never been a colonial power and had no reason to get involved in the consequences of Western imperialism. 'It is up to them to make up for what they have done to the countries of the Third World,' he said. 'We shall not attend because we do not wish to be placed in the same category as the Western powers.' He did add that the Soviet Union would render economic help to the developing countries. 'We shall of course help them, but we shall do so on a bilateral basis.'

shall be placed in the

first

I thought that the easier task would be with my fellow Austrian Bruno Kreisky, so I approached him first. We had a long talk together in Vienna and he responded positively, but with one reservation. 'I have to be sure that the main industrialized countries support me in this undertaking. I can't do it on my own,' he said. He consulted the Americans, the Germans and the French, and when they responded favourably he went ahead.

Lopez Portillo reacted immediately. As the successor to Luis Echeverría, who had played such a prominent part in the UN special assemblies on this issue, he was predisposed to take an active part, proposed Cancun as the meeting place and joined with Kreisky in issuing the invitations.

Only a few weeks before the conference was due to meet, Bruno Kreisky fell ill. The Austrian government, in consultation with Lopez Portillo and others, invited the Canadian Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, to replace him. Fortunately he was able to make himself available and was his usual forceful and effective self. I took part as representative of the United Nations and we foregathered in October 1981.

...shall be placed in the first circle. The Chinese province of Sichuan continues...

Instructive for us, and also for him, was the presence of President Reagan. This was his first major exposure to Third World leaders as a group and he told me before we dispersed that he had found it an educational experience. There were twenty-three delegations and the arrangements were both sumptuous and relaxed. The tables in the main conference hall were arranged in a huge circle. Reagan, in a short-sleeved shirt, was inevitably the centre of attention, with all the other participants watching him carefully to see whether he was prepared to yield on any of the points that were so freely made to him. He was exceedingly courteous and genial, but always tough on substance, and yielded very little. The main conference sessions never took on the form of negotiations but there were many bilateral talks in the surrounding offices and at the luncheons, dinners and social occasions, where careful organization ensured that no group was ever the same twice.

circle

I was much impressed by the forcefulness and clarity with which Mrs Gandhi supported the views of her Third World colleagues. She was very outspoken, but always left the way open for some understanding between the main participants. She was a world leader of the highest quality, and her recent assassination is a bitter tragedy for all those with the interests of international understanding at heart.

The Chinese

The Chinese delegation was led by their Prime Minister, Zhao Ziyang. He gave the impression of being a technocrat and administrator rather than the repository of high-level political power. He has a warm and sympathetic personality and gets on well with Europeans. He is also very close to Deng Xiaoping, who comes from the south-western province of Sichuan, of which Zhao was at one time the governor.

province of Sichuan

During the conference he played a low-key role, listening more than speaking: an attitude which seemed to fit his character and the basic policy of the Peking government. The Chinese still regard themselves as an under-developed country belonging to the Third World, without any ambition to play the role of a major power. They admit publicly that it will take them a long time to catch up with the other main powers. They are far behind in technology and even in technical infrastructure. Their teeming millions are hard-working and one day they will catch up with the Western world and the Soviet Union, but not soon. In my own judgement it will take them several decades; in the meantime they try desperately to acquire know-how from the Western world. Their conflict with the Soviets continues. Whether this will change with the advent of Gorbachev is open to question.

continues

There was a sharp exchange, in the course of the conference, between President Nyerere and Pierre Trudeau. Nyerere, who is never short of words, had launched into a lengthy intervention to establish that although

Tanzania was a socialist country it would welcome private investment. Trudeau was quick to respond. He asked the Tanzanian President whether he really thought that the Western nations would invest more in his country, knowing that sooner or later their investments would be jeopardized by government intervention. Nyerere and his Third World colleagues were momentarily nonplussed by the retort, but suddenly loud laughter broke out, not least from Nyerere himself, and the meeting went on to other matters.

to change

form

Regrettably the conference did not lead to any major change in the running controversy over the demands of the less developed countries for a new economic order. True to form of summit meetings, Cancun was long on flatulent generalities but short on practical results. Like so many other top-level gatherings, it provided no opportunity for the hard slog of detailed bargaining which must precede any agreement on so complex and controversial a subject. The conference made no provision for following up on its pronouncements or for making a start on global negotiations. With the onset of the recession of the 1980s, the focus shifted to short-term measures needed to save the developing countries from economic collapse. Each side took note of the views of the other and referred the whole matter back to the United Nations, where new efforts of another kind will have to be made if the world is to be relieved of this fundamental and agonizing conflict.

Subject

In all the years of my professional life as a diplomat, I learned one basic truth: it is personalities more than anything else which influence the destiny of the world. Out of this conviction, right at the beginning of my term of office as Secretary General I started to visit as many world leaders as possible. These trips to nearly all the capitals of the globe offered me the welcome opportunity not only to meet these personalities, but also to grasp the political environment in which they had to operate. Coming myself from the industrialized North, I made it a particular point to cultivate the leaders of the Third World countries which had swollen the membership of the organization. As they achieved independence, the new political leaders were primarily concerned to establish their control domestically, but most of them quickly realized how valuable the United Nations could be to them. It gave them an international sounding board and a training ground for their officials in modern diplomacy. On their own, their international influence was limited, but united in their regional and non-aligned groups they gained importance and sometimes dominated the work of the organization. There was a constant flow of heads of state and other leaders from the Third World countries to the regular annual sessions of the General Assembly. Jointly and individually, they left their mark.

the globe

to

Assembly

Mark

...to change form. Subject the globe to assembly. Mark in the Empire thus.

Lowe Marshal Tito a posthumous mention for his sturdily independent foreign policy, which established Yugoslavia as a non-aligned country. He always impressed me with his straightforwardness and his strong support for the United Nations. He was frequently critical of it, usually on the grounds that it was too inactive in international affairs and suffered from a lack of clout, but his approach was as constructive as it was frank.

We used to meet in New York and Belgrade and I was a frequent guest of his on the two-island complex of Brioni in the Adriatic off the Yugoslav coast. Under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the islands had been mosquito-ridden and uninhabited. An Austrian named Kuppelwieser had made them habitable. When Tito came to power, he had constructed handsome hotels and guest houses on the larger island and a residence for himself, surrounded by a beautiful garden, on the smaller. He lived very comfortably there, indulging in his various hobbies, which included a private zoo, where he kept a collection of exotic animals sent to him as gifts by foreign political leaders. His other hobby was to build household furniture in a small workshop set in the midst of vineyards he had himself planted. He was proud of his wines and made a point of serving them with fish caught in the surrounding waters.

in the Empire

Two factors influenced his views on foreign policy. The first was a deep fear of the Russians, particularly after the 1968 'Prague Spring' liberalization movement had been destroyed by Soviet forces. He used to tax us Austrians with what he described as our complacency in the face of the Soviet menace. 'You people are too naive,' he said. 'Don't believe that you are not in danger. I have had my experiences with the Russians. They are capable of doing anything.' He was insistent that we remained on our guard against a Soviet military thrust through Austria and south to the Dalmatian coast.

His second great foreign policy concern was to strengthen the structure of East–West *détente* and the Non-Aligned Movement, thus creating a global equilibrium as a foundation for peace. The last years of his life left him a deeply disappointed man. He witnessed a deterioration in super-power relationships and the erosion of non-alignment as it fell under the increasing influence of the more radical Third World states.

thus

I last saw Tito in a guest house in Havana during the 1979 summit conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. He was obviously physically ill and also deeply depressed. He was particularly concerned over the election of Cuba to chair the meeting, although the host country at these conferences is normally granted that honour. As the more radical leaders established their predominance, Tito's dismay increased. He was deeply exercised as to how the Non-Aligned Movement could maintain its credibility if Cuba, with its close links to the Soviet Union, were its leader.

The Cubans are extremely active in both the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement, although I did not meet Fidel Castro personally until I paid an official visit to Havana in January 1979. He is a charismatic figure, with a strong and magnetic personality, and quite an attractive spontaneity in his manner. Greeting me at the airport, he asked immediately: 'Do you want the usual diplomatic protocol, complete with receptions and social events, or would you prefer me to take you to some islands where we can have our talks in peace and quiet?'

There was only one answer to such a loaded question and it suited my own preference. We changed our clothes at a nearby guest house and flew by helicopter to the island of La Juventud a few miles to the south. This is where Castro maintains his education and paramilitary centre for young African students, principally from Angola, Mozambique and Namibia. The youngsters were all in uniform and went through their paces with enthusiasm.

Castro had organized a small dinner for my party with only his closest advisers present. After a general discussion on the international situation, he came to what was obviously uppermost in his mind, the state of relations between Cuba and the United States. He launched a bitter attack against the American administration for rejecting all his efforts to establish better contacts. The Americans were not even permitted to export medicines badly needed in Cuba and he had to seek them in Europe and elsewhere. He almost pleaded with me to use all my influence to persuade the American government and people that he really wanted good relations. I assured Castro that I would inform Washington of his views.

The following day we flew to his private island, which he called his 'little Brioni'. It is a lovely spot, although still primitive, and our talks took place on his yacht, which was tied up at a small dock. The business of the day was interrupted by a session of swimming and harpoon fishing, at which our host excelled. We observed that the group of security men who protected him were principally engaged in finding the largest shoals of fish.

As he sat on the edge of the boat, a steward approached with two glasses on a small silver tray, each filled with a dark liquid. Castro first took a sip from one glass, gargled heartily and spat the contents into the sea. Then he took the other glass and swallowed its contents before diving in. I was told later that the first contained Listerine and the other whisky. Apparently this was his manner of fortifying himself against the rigours of skin diving.

However that may be, he caught several dozen red snappers and lobsters. He personally prepared lunch; it consisted mainly of the raw seafood garnished with lemon juice, which he insisted was the best way to eat it. I have frequently been willing to sacrifice my digestive system in the

interest of international understanding, but this went beyond my normal bounds. As I found out later, Fidel Castro's strange way of preparing raw lobster was not so bad after all. Friends of ours did it the same way in Connecticut and loved it.

As on the previous evening, our talks concentrated mainly on Cuban-American relations. If this seemed a case of dialectical overkill, there was doubtless a special reason for it. At Castro's insistence, Bradford Morse, the highly respected administrator of the UN Development Programme, had been invited to all our functions for general discussions and to celebrate the opening of a new sugar mill built with the help of his organization.

Morse was a former American Congressman, well connected in Washington, and Castro doubtless wanted to use him as an additional channel to get his message through to the administration. Morse handled the situation very well.

On our departure Castro noticed my small rented aircraft standing on the airport apron. It was an old and somewhat shabby looking Falcon, with space for only nine people. Professing astonishment, he asked me with disbelief in his voice: 'Are you going back in that thing? Is it safe enough?' I assured him that it was and that in any event I had no choice. The United Nations does not possess its own aeroplane for the Secretary-General or anyone else. It rents and charters the planes it uses. I consoled myself with the thought that, if my dignity had been impaired, I might at least have convinced Castro and his revolutionary comrades of the capitalist fragility of the UN organization.

One figure in the Third World merits special respect: King Hussein of Jordan. I visited him on many occasions and was always impressed by the blend of shrewdness, wisdom and courage which he displayed. Small in stature, precise and careful in speech, he has survived the turmoil besetting his country from outside as well as from its large and unruly Palestinian elements within. He combines courage with cautious diplomacy. A highly intelligent man, he supports a Western style of life while maintaining deep roots in Moslem traditions. Experience has taught him the value of prudence. As a young boy, he saw his father assassinated by Palestinian extremists while standing on the steps of a mosque in Jerusalem. His engagement in the Six-Day War of 1967 cost him Arab Jerusalem and his territory on the West Bank of the Jordan. These were hard lessons indeed.

His reluctance to respond to Western proposals that he should negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians should come as no surprise. He can only do so with the approval of the other Arab states. His *rapprochement* with Arafat

Figure one. In his mind, he views a dark glass sea. Before diving in, he talks of dialectical space. Jerusalem. Jerusalem Indeed.

and his joint approach to President Mubarek clearly show were his aspirations lie. Mubarek supports Hussein's policies to the best of his abilities, but he too must be wary of provoking his fundamentalists. The joint endeavours to involve Washington actively in the peace process and to negotiate with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation have met with considerable American reserve. For his part, President Reagan is facing a strong Israeli lobby which seeks to thwart all contact with the PLO. It is also no surprise that Muhammad Gaddafi should reject Hussein's proposals.

I received repeated invitations from Colonel Gaddafi to visit him in Libya. It was always one of my problems to visit certain countries at the right time, because such personal encounters are immediately interpreted by the international media as a gesture of support for this or that government. In the case of Gaddafi – whom I met in August 1977 in Tripoli – it was particularly delicate because of his alleged support of terrorist activities. When I brought this up with him, he reacted sharply and indignantly. It was absolutely untrue, he said, that he was supporting international terrorism. All he did and would continue to do was to support liberation movements which had, he asserted, even under the UN Charter, the right to fight for their independence. That could be done without acts of terrorism. When I left Gaddafi one simple thought again came to my mind: as long as there is no objective distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters, it will always be left to governments and people to make their own subjective assessment. Nevertheless I always find it important to keep contact with all political leaders whatever their political outcasts when one day their co-operation may be needed to solve an international problem.

President Houari Boumédienne of Algeria and I had several encounters over the economic demands of the Third World and the plight of Polisario hostages on his border. He was not an easy man to deal with but I managed to establish good relations with him and he was quite co-operative. He was highly critical of the attitudes of the industrialized nations and known for his tough, rigid approach in the negotiations on the new economic order.

Boumédienne was equally at odds with his neighbour, King Hassan of Morocco, whose army had taken over the former Spanish colony of the Western Sahara. The Algerian President had reacted violently, accusing King Hassan of imperialism. The territory was so sparsely populated that neither the Spanish records, the Algerians, the Moroccans nor the UN were ever able to determine exactly how many people lived there. The best guess was between eighty and one hundred thousand, predominantly

nomads, among whom it would have been almost impossible to conduct a referendum to determine their political future.

King Hassan was equally intransigent and almost as difficult to deal with. His firm position that the former Spanish Sahara was an integral part of Morocco – rejecting all claims of the liberation movement Polisario for an independent state – created a deep division within the OAU. When, in 1984, Polisario was admitted under the name 'Arab Democratic Republic of Sahrawi' as a full member to the OAU, Morocco and her friends left the organization, creating a most serious crisis for the OAU. On one visit I had great difficulty in obtaining an appointment with the King. So I indicated to his staff that I wished to present him with the United Nations peace medal, a gold medallion which I made a practice of giving to all the Heads of State I visited during my term of office. The King received me the following morning. He also invited me to join him in the royal train, in which, as it turned out, he was making a tour to mobilize public opinion as part of the 'green march' designed to annex the Spanish Sahara. This placed me in an entirely false position, but fortunately there were no unpleasant repercussions.

The chief victim of this unhappy dispute was the President of Mauritania, Mr Mohtar Ould Daddah, who had been persuaded by the Moroccans to occupy the southern part of the territory abandoned by the Spaniards. Daddah was a modest-looking man, educated in France and married to a French lady whose hobby was writing books for children. His official residence had such limited facilities that his reception and dinner for me took place in a tent put up in the garden. We squatted on cushions cross-legged and were served with the traditional racks of lamb, although I managed to avoid eating the eyes when they were served. The Sahara situation was clearly beyond his control and the Polisario liberation units continuously attacked the fragile forces of the Mauritanian army. After a number of palace revolutions Ould Daddah was deposed in a bloodless coup and the Mauritanian government had to surrender its claim to the Western Sahara in 1979.

Much happier were my relationships with two outstanding African leaders, President Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal and President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. Both are highly cultivated men, former members of the French National Assembly and experienced statesmen. Their influence in the shaping of African policies towards the former colonial powers was of greatest importance. Senghor is a philosopher and poet of international standing and Houphouët-Boigny one of the wisest men the African continent has produced. Defenders of the free market economy, their countries were among the more prosperous nations in Africa.

Is is. There is no distinction between ideology and image. One. He records his name on a gold medallion. Two. The philosopher...

Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia is another African leader of great stature. His honesty and personal warmth have created many friends in the United Nations and in the world at large. He is a strong defender of the continent's interests and a determined opponent of South Africa's apartheid policies. He is also a very religious man. At a dinner party during my first official visit, in 1973, he turned to me and asked: 'Are you a Protestant or a Catholic?' I was somewhat surprised by the question and must have shown it, because he went on: 'I have two priests here at the table, one Catholic and one Protestant, to say grace but I have to know on whom I should call.'

Dignity and protocol were not always maintained during these trips. Although it is some time ago now, I cannot forget a visit I paid to Kenya in the summer of 1974 to see President Kenyatta. I was informed that he would receive me in the small village of Nakuru, some way from the capital, where he was opening the agricultural fair. I was flown there in a special aircraft and arrived in the middle of the ceremony. Prizes were being given to the best bulls, and tribal dancers then filled the arena. Suddenly Kenyatta turned to me and asked whether I would like to join him in congratulating them. I saw no harm in this and accompanied him into their midst, where, after a few exchanges, he took me by the hand and suggested we join the dance. This aroused universal enthusiasm and applause but I could not help asking myself whether it had been a worthwhile visit when, instead of having political talks with Kenyatta, I ended up in a cattle show dancing with him.

Perhaps my most embarrassing experience was at Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso. This was part of a tour of the drought stricken Sahel region – stretching from Senegal in the west to Ethiopia and Somalia in the east – which I undertook in February 1974. My itinerary included seventeen countries in an attempt to co-ordinate the UN emergency relief operation for tens of thousands who were starving. The co-ordinating committee had been summoned to his modest capital by President Lamizana and it was planned that I should go on to the balcony of his official residence to make an appeal to the international community for further help to these stricken people. Television and radio were in attendance and even before leaving New York I had prepared a dramatic plea to read out to the thousands of people I had been promised would be standing in the square in front of the palace. When we got out on to the balcony there was not a soul to be seen. I turned to the President, asking for an explanation. It soon became clear that the minister in charge of the event had forgotten to make any public announcement of my speech and therefore no one had turned up. In order to salvage something from the occasion I recorded my address for subsequent use.

What would appear to be yet another example of Third World governments in disarray is in fact merely symptomatic of a much more profound and complicated problem common to all developing countries. It is all too easy to blame them for their lack of experience and absence of infrastructure, but that only detracts from the root cause of the developing countries' present plight. The economic, political, social and cultural problems confronting the developing countries are legion; equally divergent are the means for overcoming hunger, poverty and injustice that are put forward by the members of the UN in their endeavours to support the development of the Third World. In the final analysis, all development models are part and parcel of specific social models. Having seen and heard a plethora of programmes and concepts during my ten years of office, I see no merit in adding to the confusion by bringing forward new proposals. To my mind, and based on my experience, certain basic principles hold true and must be subscribed to if any long-term development strategy is to succeed.

Hitherto, development aid, both in its conception and in its implementation, has adhered to foreign models, such an approach was doomed, since it made no allowance for those features peculiar to society in the developing countries. The education system propagated in most developing countries, for example, does not meet real social needs. Illiteracy rates are still climbing because most developing countries have not been able to introduce primary education on a general scale. Higher education is often seen as a sign of social achievement, a kind of status symbol, while technical education and vocational training are still not considered priorities. A new educational system suited to the specific needs of the individual countries is a major factor in socio-economic development and should be recognised as such.

Self-reliance is a deeply rooted tradition in the developing countries; it offers a firm basis on which sensible aid programmes can be developed. For example, a plan of action oriented towards the achievement of self-sufficiency in food should be the guiding principle for all international efforts to combat famine and starvation, particularly in Africa.

Most developing countries can be seen to be suffering from an identity crisis which takes on the form of bitter and sometimes violent attempts to reassert their cultural identity. Unfortunately, this particular issue is sometimes taken as a pretext for diverting public attention away from pressing day-to-day problems, and it is sometimes exploited for purely ideological reasons. In shaping aid

...must say is. The world is legion. The self is a suffering form. Its is.

programmes and promoting economic co-operation, the international community should recognize the aspirations of the individual countries and foster their traditional values. Approached from this angle, a country's assertion of its cultural heritage will proceed within the right context, rather than be debased to a mere political slogan.

The gap between rural and urban areas is forever widening: development, services and infrastructure are wanting in rural areas, with the result that the unending waves of urban immigration give rise to awesome conurbations and new social problems. Rural development should thus take on priority in any development plan. The absence of planned infrastructure incurs a wastage of valuable resources and under-utilization of machinery and equipment. Steps should thus be taken on an international scale to assist the developing countries in building up the infrastructure needed to absorb new technologies and subsequently to adapt them to prevailing conditions.

National security is a major concern in the developing countries, whose independence is for the most part still young. Unfortunately, in their search for external and internal security the majority of them fall within the super-powers' sphere of influence. Given this situation, an atmosphere of relative peace and security conducive to development is one of the most important preconditions for improving the living standards of the poor nations.

As I write, the North-South issue is as far from resolution as ever. The recovery of the industrialized states from the most recent recession has been uneven and precarious. Most of the poorest developing countries, and even many of those more prosperous, are in dire straits, while a number of them are weighed down by onerous debt burdens and high interest rates. The quest for a new international economic order has perforce given way to more immediate, practical concerns. Developed and developing countries alike are striving to prevent massive defaults on international loans, and an increasing mood of protectionism is jeopardizing international markets.

In a crisis situation emergency measures are required. But deep-seated maladjustments and persistent world economic difficulties call for longer-term solutions. If world prosperity is to be restored on a sustainable basis, all concerned must take responsible and concerted action: North and South, market and centrally planned economies, oil-exporting and oil-importing countries, governments, international organizations and the private sector, including the banks. Only through the co-ordinated efforts

Waves rise and fall, but the sea remains.

of all these institutions shall we be able to shake off our present difficulties and advance anew.

However necessary and however beneficial the spontaneous raising of funds throughout the world may be in terms of saving the lives of hundreds of thousands in Africa and Asia, it has nothing to do with the kind of development policy under discussion here. Long-term development aid should in no way be considered a form of charity to any country. It should be based on enlightened self-interest in the industrialized countries. The recognition of global economic interdependence, which has emerged particularly in the past decade, has established a direct and strong link between the developed and the developing world.

Whereas the South needs help to help itself if it is to overcome hunger and misery, the North needs the markets and purchasing power of the South. The prosperity of the Third World is, therefore, indissolubly linked to global trade. If trade expands, the world economy expands. Moreover, I cannot foresee international security being firmly established for generations to come as long as islands of wealth persist in a sea of world poverty. The basic truth remains – neither side can prosper without the other.

Step Three

. . . A world is a world is a world. (page 7)

Even so the world has to go on.

To complain about love in front of the famous Chagall window does not make a difference.

He shall be placed in the first circle.

The Chinese province of Sichuan continues to change form.

Subject the globe to assembly.

Mark in the empire thus.

[Figure 1].

In his mind he views a dark glass sea.

Before diving in he talks of dialectical space.

Jerusalem. Jerusalem indeed.

Is is.

There is no distinction between ideology and image.

One.

He records his name on a gold medallion.

Two.

The philosopher must say is.

The world is legion.

The self is a suffering form.

Is is.

Waves rise and fall, but the sea remains.