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TRANSLATING ORIGINS: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PHILOSOPHY

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If translation does not start as the original question then it is, at the very least, a start in the questioning of the origin.¹ The origin as that which is put into question brings psychoanalysis and translation into contact since both are marked by the inevitability and necessity within their origins - including their own conception of the origin - of the process named within psychoanalysis as *Nachträglichkeit*; a term which at this stage can be translated as 'deferred action,' or 'action at a distance.'² The tentative nature of these translations does not gesture to the provisional as opposed to the final, it is rather that it attests to the difficulty of the task projected by having to think the stakes of this term. Moreover, an important part of any subsequent attempt to undertake this task will have to include specifying the 'action' envisaged and tracing the effect of the 'distance' involved. Despite the inherently complex nature of this project, an integral component of the translation problem presented by *Nachträglichkeit* will have already been provided by the process that it, in some sense, names. Identifying this component brings about, within the shift of tenses, a shift to naming. With this reworking the origin itself comes to be reworked. And yet it should also be remembered that there is more involved here than a simple connection or interrelation since translation figures from the start within psychoanalysis. Rather than trace the multitude of references, the repetition of the word 'Übersetzung' and its many correlates (e.g. 'Umsetzung'), one will have to introduce, and thus prop, the discussion to come; i.e., the letter written by Freud to Wilhelm Fleiss on 6 December 1896.

Prior to tracing the work of this specific reference, the perdurance of the origin should be indicated. The origin here is the origin of convention; tradition's origin. It yields to, if only because it yields, a fascination, as much sedulous as discursive, for that moment marking the beginning. A start which is the point where something will have begun. (The point or moment will always involve both ontological as well as temporal considerations.) Following the convention, the demands of tradition, any return to the start will generate it again - the start again - where the

'again' is intended to avoid degeneration because of its incorporation or reincorporation into that construal of repetition in which the process of repetition is structured and governed by the Same. The Same sustains a conception of repetition in which what is repeated remains, despite the work of time, self-identical. The possibility of the inscription of difference is excluded. The viability, let alone the durability, of this exclusion remains an open question.

Many commentators have referred to the importance of the letters written by Freud to Fleiss, and in particular the letter of 6 December 1896. Of the different permutations that translation acquires within it perhaps the most significant in this instance is the following: 'Die Versagung der Übersetzung, das ist das, was klinisch "Verdrängung" heisst.'³ In passing, the unavoidability of translation should be stated in advance. Repression, within the frame of the letter, is then the clinical meaning ('heisst') of what elsewhere is a 'Versagung der Übersetzung.' It is essential to note that repression is, in the move from the non-clinical to the clinical, already a translation; a carrying over from one domain to the other. In other words, 'Die Versagung der Übersetzung' is, even within the confines of one language, already a translation; namely of 'Verdrängung.' The presence of the already present translation is of considerable significance, since it opens up as a translation the problematic nature of translation, i.e., within the confines of this sentence, it is translation that puts into play the problem of translation. The question that must be asked therefore is, of what is it a translation? In other words, what has come to be translated? These questions gesture towards the translated event and thus to the event of translation. They mark out that which is already taking place. The event is not outside. Indeed, the problem of the 'event' is already at work within translation. (This 'within' does not designate a space as such, rather it brings into play a series of relationships as much contingent as symbiotic.) Any attempt to give greater clarity or specificity to the event will have to involve a reconsideration of its ontologico-temporal nature. The event cannot be merely posited as though it were given within the exclusive singularity of a specific mode of being. Moreover, there is a connection of considerable importance between the event and the origin. Once the origin is no longer the *arché* - the beginning within the Same, the same beginning - but an origin whose repetition involves the logic of the again and the anew, such that its re-presentation will always take place again and for the first time, then this reworking of the origin establishes a point of intersection between the event and the origin since both are now articulated within, as well as articulating, the movement and temporal spacing which is designated by the term *Nachträglichkeit*. How this designation is to be understood is a question that will be addressed throughout the proceeding.

Freud's letter opens by specifying the question of translation. Even if repression translates 'die Versagung der Übersetzung' what is left open or unanswered is the following question: what is its translation? While holding the general question of translation open, a way ahead will have already been provided by other translations of this line. Masson, in his edition of the letters, taking up the lead set by the Strachey translation, translates the whole sentence as: 'A failure of translation - this is what is known clinically as "repression."⁴ 'Versagung' is now 'failure.' Prior to pursuing the consequences of this failure there is a preliminary problem. Even if it has to be assumed that the problem of the translation of 'heisst' as 'known' can, at this stage, only be noted, it is nonetheless worth recognizing this intrusion of knowledge into semantics; of knowing into meaning. It will be essential to return to this discursive substitution in order to begin an attempted clarification of the relationship between epistemology and judgment within psychoanalysis. The problematic nature of this relationship figures in Masson's translation.

Jean Laplanche, in a recent article, 'Spécificité des problèmes terminologiques dans la traduction de Freud,'⁵ translates the opening segment of the sentence as 'un refusment de traduction.' (The neologism of 'un refusment' must also be noted.⁶) As a point of departure it is clear that the two possibilities, 'a failure of translation,' 'un refusment de traduction,' do not straightforwardly, at least in the straightforward and hence problematic sense of translation, translate each other. There is therefore an apparent failure of translation. There would seem to be only one alternative if the inevitability of such an outcome is to be avoided; recourse must be made to the source, to the origin. What then, here, is the original? The response is unproblematic, 'Die Versagung der Übersetzung.' An expression which is itself a term that comes, within the clinical context, to be translated by 'Verdrängung.' The difficulties are compounded. The problematic element is not the presence of the difficulty of translation within psychoanalysis, nor is it a regional difficulty, since the question - what is the original? - depends for its force, both heuristic and ontological, upon an answer to a more fundamental philosophical question; i.e., what is an origin? This is the question from the start. Here, however, it will be pursued concretely: what is an origin within psychoanalysis?

As a prelude to any consideration of the origin, what needs to be brought into consideration are two elements whose ineliminable presence - a presence always at work - traverses the psychoanalytic as well as the philosophical. The first is time and the second is style. In relation to the second of these points François Roustang, in *Psychoanalysis Never Lets Go*, introduces an important connection between translation and style. Style here refers to the text's self-presentation. It is a connection that

bears upon the origin since it involves the status of what comes to be translated.

Freud's writing loses all of its vigour and even its meaning in the majority of French translations and even in the English translation of the *Standard Edition*, because the translators are only interested in rendering the overall meaning of a sentence defined by its syntax without concerning themselves with word placement and repetitions. If parataxis is to be respected in Freud's text, it is because his writing is itself the machine that he puts together: in other words, this machine is his discourse and one cannot displace its parts without disrupting its function.⁷

Despite the timely nature of Roustang's warning, it still leaves open the question of what exactly is involved in respecting parataxis. Since style opens the question of its own significance rather than answering and thereby closing off the question of signification, it follows that just posing the question of style is on its own far from sufficient. Is it, for example, a different state of affairs in regard to Freud's texts than it would be in reading C. F. Meyer's novella *Die Richterin* or his short story 'Gustav Adolphs Page,' the latter being the text in which Freud, in another letter to Fleiss, 9 June 1898, noted two examples of *Nachträglichkeit*?⁸ (The specific formulation is 'den Gedanken der Nachträglichkeit.' It will be necessary to return to this formulation and thus to the 'thought' or 'idea' of *Nachträglichkeit*.) Style is inevitably linked to genre and therefore to the specific expectations of reading. In regard to the question of style it may be, at this stage, sufficient to indicate that the analyst as translator is only ever interested, even if only as a prelude, in parataxis. (It will be seen that the prelude in question posits translation both as an origin, as well as at the origin.) In order to dwell upon these questions it is essential to turn to time because it is within time that the question of the origin and its translation, even its existence as the always already translated, comes to be posed. This does not mean that style is displaced, it is rather that the displacement that, in part, is style is the enactment of the process of translation, one with rather than without the other.

Any approach to time that eschews reducing it to the recitation of dates and the establishing of a chronology - while of course including them as determinations that can never be either absolute or exhaustive - overcomes simplicity by forming a complex. Part of that complex will be the date, however no longer as the absolute singular point, but as the pragma.⁹ This complex will both form and inform its own expression. While it will remain the case that time brings with it the centrality of ontology and experience within philosophy, the difficulty with such claims will always reside in the sense that is to be given to the 'with.'

Posing time within a framework established by connectives and conjunctions - e.g. 'with,' 'and' - seems to suggest that it is possible to posit the other elements or components to which time is connected independently of time itself. The independence suggested by the positioning of such terms means, moreover, that what eludes consideration is the possibility of either existence or time working to delimit the other in an original sense. Any subsequent delimitation or mediation is premised upon an initial singular and isolated positing.¹⁰ Indeed, the contrary is the case, for it must be recognised that in spite of the disjunctive (as well as the conjunctive) force of terms such as 'with,' 'and,' etc., time and existence, rather than being brought together and therefore involving a relation to come, are always already interarticulated. (Part of the argument for this interarticulation is that thinking the conditions of possibility of a given mode of being or mode of temporality will bring with it as an ineliminable component the temporality or existence entailed by that mode. Within this revision of the transcendental argument entailment does not entail a temporal sequence, but on the contrary it marks the complex simultaneity of the present.) The relation therefore will have already been established. In order to avoid the risk of reducing this relation to a unity and thus of essentializing it, it will be necessary to articulate, perhaps re-articulate, the relation - and thus relations - in terms of specific ontologico-temporal concatenations, as opposed to an undifferentiated and thus an as-yet-to-be-determined, though necessarily singular, being and time.¹¹ It would follow from this rearticulation that posing the question of time is, at the same time, to pose the question of existence. It is here that a digression is essential. One of the ways of this digression will bring into play elements of a philosophical stance that gives centrality to what will henceforth be described as a differential ontology.¹² It goes without saying that it is the sense of ontology that needs to be clarified.

The traditional problems posed by the location of the centrality of ontology are, firstly, that time comes to be excluded, and, secondly, that the ontological is thought either in terms of singularity or at the very least as a limit concept such that events could be posited independently of ontologico-temporal concerns. It is not the case that these problems are to be overcome either by an act of sublation or even one of transgression. It is rather that they both mark an inadequate conception or understanding of ontology. It is one bounded by the necessary presence of a necessary unity within conceptions of Being, i.e., where Being itself is unified such that it does not admit of either internal diversity or diremption. Furthermore, not only must Being involve an internal unity, it must, in order that it be thought, be itself a unity, i.e., exist without external relations and determinations. This latter conception will be the case even in those instances in which this presence - Being as unity - is not presented as

such. This twofold necessity demands not just an origin that comprises being at the origin, it also involves an ontology that is always already a unity. The possibility of a plurality, including the possibility of overdetermination will, as a consequence, always be parasitic upon the original unity of the event; the event as original unity. Plurality and difference emerge, therefore, as no more than tropes always dependent upon a pre-existent unity.

The event presented in this way will be complete unto itself. The reason for this completion is that the event 'is' in its being - being by forming - its own completion. While it is not a universal in the sense that it is opposed to particulars, the event, thus construed, is nonetheless a self-referring universal in that it excludes difference from within itself and generates a philosophical task in which it must be thought in its unity as a singular event. (Heidegger's formulation in *Zeit und Sein* of thinking Being 'ohne Rücksicht' ['without relation'] to either beings or metaphysics is an example of such a philosophical strategy.¹³) Within it difference is an after-effect, even if it is deemed to have occurred 'prior' to thinking Being as such. Difference in this sense would obscure the thinking of Being. If, in contradistinction to this presentation of both the event and the event of difference, difference is taken as original and not as the after-work of unity, then despite the radical nature of this move, it will not give rise to either the abandoning of ontology or the relativizing of Being. Such conclusions would be no more than the countermoves demanded by the promulgation of the necessity of a necessary unity. The positing of unity is not countered by an op-positing. Rather than either denial or relativity emerging as the result of this 'contrary' though not oppositional move, there will be a shift in that which is taken to be central. The substitution, however, is not one for one. The initial plurality of both modes of being, as well as the event, will from now on involve a differential ontology. (Remembering, of course, the difficulties that will always be attached to any use of the term 'initial.') Time and existence, therefore, will need to be understood as anoriginally plural. The anoriginal is a term used to designate an ontological and temporal differential plurality at the origin.

One direct result of such an understanding is the impossibility of positioning a differential ontology within the Heideggerian distinction between *Sein* and *seinde*; i.e., Heideggerian ontological difference as initially formulated in *Being and Time*. The importance of this latter Heideggerian distinction is that it generates a specific mode of philosophical questioning. The mode enjoined will be held in abeyance. A different conception of the philosophical task will come to the fore. Here the anoriginal will be linked to time. It designates, as part of a differential ontology, an original irreducibility. The difference in question - the difference that in a strict sense is the irreducible rather than simply

entailing irreducibility - involves different modes of being and thus different ontologico-temporal concatenations. These concatenations are the sites of, and are sited in, differing relations to presence and modes of being present. The question of presence, the plurality within being present, is of fundamental significance for psychoanalysis. It becomes, for example, a way by which to account for the interplay of the topographical and economic differences between the unconscious and the conscious. The presence of one within the other means that there are, at any one moment in time, i.e., any date, two irreducible modes of being present. As presence becomes the site of irreducibility, this will mean that presence can no longer be absolutely present to itself. And yet this does not preclude either the specific determination of the present or such a determination at the present. Presence returns within and as the pragma.

The anoriginal marks the possibility of the event being either potentially or actually plural, which, to characterize it in the negative, will mean that the event will always lack an essential unity. (Within the framework of translation, what could be said to be lacking is an already given semantic and interpretive finitude, if not singularity, of the source text.) It is thus that there is no unity to be recovered, no task of thinking the origin as such, since the origin, now the anorigin, is already that which resists the move to a synthetic unity. Any unity will be an after-effect. Such after-effects are comprised of given determinations, interpretations or translations. This determinate after-event is the pragma; the reworked singular as the citation within the site of a continual reworking and within which this continuity of work is itself sited but only a citation. The necessity of the pragma is inescapable. The mistake is to posit an exclusive relation between it and the 'origin.' (Relation here can take the form of, for example, identity, causality.) The pragma's presence, its mode of being present must generate a different response to the question of knowledge. The event - that which is anoriginally plural - cannot be known as such, because it cannot be said to exist *as such*. This will not mean that each claim is provisional, for the power of the provisional lies in the possibility of an eventual or at least an idealized realization or actualization of knowledge. Knowledge works within the unity or homology demanded by the identity between a source text and translation; or between an object of interpretation and mode of interpretation, etc. It is rather that what is at play here is the active presence of judgment operating in the place of knowledge. The homological will cede its place to the heterological.

Here what emerges with, and within, the posited centrality of a differential ontology is the possibility of rethinking time - the time of interpretation and translation - beyond the trap opened by the interplay of *arché* and *telos*. It is within this trap that the *arché* is the origin. The point from which a beginning is made. It is thus the point back to which

it will always be possible to go in order to trace the effectuation that is the movement towards the goal; a movement inexorably teleological. The point of departure is given. Fixed within an ontology of stasis, it is the purported pure and singular event. The movement away and the movement back obtain their conditions of possibility from a conception of time as sequential continuity. The origin or source, as given, means that any departure from it can always be evaluated - if evaluation is needed - by recourse back to the origin. This is, of course, the movement occasioned by sequential continuity. The possibility of evaluation is premised upon the already present existence of a homological relation between origin and consequence. The homological relation at work here is often presented in terms of causality. It is, for example, only the identification of the cause that gives rise to the possibility of evaluation. As will be seen, this is the model adopted by Breuer and Freud in a joint paper on hysterical phenomena written in 1893.

Within this purview, the time of translation would be that which is carried over through time from the source text to the translated text. The source or origin, in order to be carried over, must be such that its unity as a source is not impaired in the act of translation. This must be the case in order that the translation remain faithful. The possibility of recourse to the origin is itself only a viable move if the origin is articulated within an ontological similitude where the presence of the Same means that it - the origin - can come to be repeated, more or less faithfully. While fidelity is always a matter of degree, in this instance the 'degree' is structured by the ideal of pure translation, namely absolute commensurability. This is the ideal within the work of homology. Underpinning ontological similitude, the reign of the Same, and the origin's capacity to function as the source of evaluation, is the necessary impossibility that the origin might be, itself, a translation. It is this possibility that has to be excluded, if an infinite regress is to be avoided. Once the trap, opened by the interplay of *arché* and *telos*, is closed, what will emerge is that it is precisely this possibility that can never be excluded. Moreover, it is a possibility that is inherent within psychoanalysis and thus can come to be thought, in part, within its terminology. Furthermore, it is this possibility that occasions its own reformulation in terms of the ontology and temporality of *Nachträglichkeit*.

Time within psychoanalysis is signaled in titles (e.g. 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable'), though more profoundly in strategies. However, time is more correctly understood in relation to the impossible possibility of the singular event having the function of an *arché*. That this paradoxical state is never satisfactorily resolved within the corpus of Freud's writing is signaled by Laplanche and Pontalis in their argument that

In the notion of the original fantasy come to be joined what can be called the desire [*le désir*] of Freud to find the rock of the event [*le roc de l'événement*] . . . and the need [*l'exigence*] to found the structure of the fantasy on something other than the event.¹⁴

The identification of the paradoxical interplay of 'le désir' and 'l'exigence' is given detailed elaboration by Laplanche and Pontalis in *Fantasma originaire, Fantasmés des origines, Origines du fantasme*. Rather than focus on this interplay, emphasis will be given to the temporal considerations to which it gives rise. Time, here, involves the necessity of a philosophical elaboration.

The event as the source/origin/'roc' of the fantasy is a possibility which, even though it may only permeate Freud's writings in terms of a 'desire,' and while it is perhaps more properly placed in the writings of Breuer, nonetheless underlies the strategy of their joint 1893 paper 'On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: A Preliminary Communication.'¹⁵ Here they write of the event in terms of its being a 'precipitating cause.' It is the event and the role of the event as cause which comes to be forgotten. The practice of analysis which is given by this conception of the event becomes the attempted overcoming of this forgetting. Moreover, it is often a forgetting that is compounded by a subsequent forgetting of the having forgotten. The strategy of hypnosis is structured around the lost single event: the event thus construed is itself impervious to any subsequent reworking. It does not resist it, it is rather that it is presented as resistant to it. The singularity of the event precludes reworking because any reworking would mean that it was produced, reproduced, again and for the first time. The logic of forgetting and retrieval will have given way to the logic of the again and anew. Furthermore, hypnosis as cure, and hence the initial understanding of hysteria, is based on a particular structure; one which is articulated in terms of a specific ontologico-temporal concatenation. It is this structure that must be sketched in greater detail.

As a point of departure there are three fundamental elements that ought to be identified. The first element is the forgotten experience or 'precipitating cause.' The cause is an event in time. Time here involves the date of the event and the place of that event - the dated event - within the temporality of sequential continuity, i.e., chronology. In addition, it is a construal of time in which events occur and can be dated as such, and moreover it is one from which any event can be recovered. The second element is the causal relation between the event and the hysteria. The third is the particular presentation of the cure. The cure involves a twofold recognition. On the one hand, there is the recognition of the event itself as itself. On the other, there is the recognition that the connection between event and symptom is causal. These interrelated

points are expressed by Breuer in one of his contributions to the *Studies on Hysteria* in the following way. (The extent to which Breuer's formulations were fully endorsed by Freud, or even consistent with other formulations in the text as a whole, is a question that is yet to be resolved.)

We may reverse the dictum 'cessante causa cessat effectus' (when the cause ceases the effect ceases) and conclude from these observations that the determining process (i.e., the recollection of it) continues to operate for years - not indirectly, through a chain of intermediate causal links, but as a directly releasing cause - just as a psychical pain that is remembered in waking consciousness still provokes a lachrymal secretion long after the event.¹⁶

The time through which these elements pass is, as has been indicated, that of a sequential continuity that has been disrupted by forgetting. Time and existence here work to create the following logic. (Once again what is at stake is the presence of this logic, not its viability.) The break with, though also within, continuity occasions the need for treatment because the symptom's cause has been forgotten. The temptation to view this as a case of displacement must be resisted, since displacement leaves a trace. The work of displacement is present in (perhaps as) the symptom. Here there is a different economy at work. The symptom's cause has been completely removed. There is therefore no trace, not even the trace of the removal itself. The symptom opens onto an absence which must be filled. At the same time, however, it is the temporality of sequential continuity that provides the treatment's conditions of possibility. The tear has established a false continuity which demands and sanctions the creation, via the overcoming of forgetting, of the true sequence. The tear in time can be repaired and the forgotten scar erased. This is only possible because the event, the experience, took place. It happened. Its occurrence was placed in time. The place, once forgotten, and the singular event, no longer announced, can now sanction their own reincorporation back into time. The event is marked and marks the purity of its existence. Static, it bears itself as the 'precipitating cause.' The event demands an ontology of stasis and can only be seen as itself when enacted within one. Its singularity is articulated therein. This means that any return to the event must yield the event as it actually was. The event itself can never be the site of an interest, an investment or a reworking. If any of these were to take place, it would mean that the event which returned would have been rendered other than itself. Its return would deny the self-identity demanded by the logic which is operative within it. Homology would have become impossible. The return, therefore, must be one in which it - the event - returned as itself. If the strategy of hypnosis and the early conception of hysteria are to be at all viable, the event, the event as

forgotten and the event now remembered, must be one and the same. In sum, at work here is a conception of repetition in which what comes to be repeated is always one and the same. A repetition without difference dictated by the reign of the Same. It must be added that this movement which is governed and maintained by Sameness is also at play when there is a symbolization of the 'precipitating cause.' This is clear from their presentation of the case of Elisabeth von R, and in particular from the manner of her purported cure.¹⁷

The full force of Freud's famous claim in the letter to Fleiss of 21 September 1897, that 'I no longer believe in my neurotica',¹⁸ will only come into play once it is seen as demanding a conception of time and existence that is situated beyond the oscillations within sequential continuity, where events come to be placed as 'precipitating causes.' There is more at stake in Freud's claim than the mere abandoning of a simple belief. What has been given up gives way to a different movement and thus to another event. It is this resituating - this dis-placement - that, firstly, is marked by the term *Nachträglichkeit* and, secondly, is in part made possible by the theory of sexuality.

What is curiously absent from the *Studies on Hysteria*, though perhaps less so from Freud's final contribution, 'The Psychotherapy of Hysteria,' is the recognition that hysteria in addition to having a cause must also have a series of preconditions. In other words, even though the subject is capable of hysteria, there are no systematic reasons given in the *Studies on Hysteria* for the possibility of hysteria. Why hysteria? There is no more than, in a given case, e.g. the rudeness of Elisabeth von R's husband, the identification of the hysteria's cause. What is provided by these early studies is a history rather than an archaeology. This is the argument advanced by Laplanche, using a Foucauldian vocabulary, in *New Foundations for Psychoanalysis* (p. 58). History in this sense is no more than the movement of chronology and the consequent locating and relocating of dated events. This movement is itself only possible within a particular conception of time. The movement away from both history and teleology is not necessarily towards archaeology in Foucault's sense, but rather towards a different understanding of time and existence. Within this understanding the event will emerge as a complex. In other words, the departure from teleology and the temporality of sequential continuity will involve releasing any retention of the event as originally singular. The singular will become the pragma; i.e., a trope of complexity, singularity as an after-effect that cites the complexity. The event will emerge as that which has already involved a complex and which is thus already a complex. It is within the terms set by this complexity that translation can come to be introduced. The event as an originally complex, a complex that no longer depends on an initial simplicity,

means that the event has, as will be suggested, the same status as a translation.

The explanatory model within most texts of this period is for the greater part inadequate when viewed in relation to the larger psychoanalytic project. The question of adequacy and inadequacy is always difficult. It is, however, a difficulty that is compounded by Freud's unpublished work of 1895, 'A Project for a Scientific Psychology,' for this text contains elements that have recently been retrieved for psychoanalysis. Nonetheless, absent from the vast majority of the models was the recognition of the constitution of the subject as gendered. In other words, it was no sexuality as such - having a gender - but the theory of sexuality - being gendered - that was absent. Missing from these texts was any conception of the subject as always already being gendered.

In subsequent texts, the positioning of the subject, its being gendered, is played out in relation to the work of the Oedipal complex. In *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, Freud deals with the problem of origins and the origins of sexuality by arguing that children

bring germs of sexual activity with them into the world, that they already enjoy sexual satisfaction when they begin to take nourishment and they persistently seek to repeat the experience in the familiar activity of thumb sucking.¹⁹

As the passage indicates, these 'germs' need to be understood in relation to the drives. The drives when situated in the individual, here the infant, can only be viewed as at work within the infant's situation. Consequently, not only must the process of being gendered refer to this situation, it is also a situation that cannot be dominated by the infant, nor moreover is it exclusive to the infant itself. In it the infant becomes the site of the projection of adult unconscious fantasies at the same time as it moves from self-gratification to auto-eroticism. Before returning to the 'Project' it is essential to pursue the interplay of unconscious fantasy and the auto-erotic.

Laplanche and Pontalis²⁰ describe the emergence of auto-eroticism as involving a break in the link between sexuality and a natural object and its subsequent connection to a hallucinated object. Consequently, there is an experience of the 'original satisfaction,' though this time it takes place 'in the absence of the real object.' At the same time, therefore, as this is the 'origin' of auto-eroticism, it is the 'origin' of fantasy. This original situation, this site, becomes the place of a number of different activities. The difference in question does not pertain to that which is mutually exclusive, but to the interactive. The site generates questions for the infant, sustains the adult's unconscious fantasies, is the 'origin' of the infant's fantasies and finally is itself traversed by the work of the Oedipal complex. Though the time involved is complex, these activities are co-

present. This situation, this complex, has the same structure as the event of translation. It is, perhaps, an anoriginal translation.

In relation to the 'Project,' however, it is the connection between sexuality, and hence this site, and *Nachträglichkeit* that makes this text of interest. It is, of course, the case of Emma that is central. It is essential to note how Freud analyses her fear of going into shops alone.

In the shop the two assistants were laughing: this laughing aroused (unconsciously) the memory of the shopkeeper. Indeed, the situation had yet another similarity [to the earlier one]: she was once again in the shop alone. Together with the shopkeeper she remembered his grabbing her clothes; but since then she had reached puberty. The memory aroused what it was certainly not able to at the time, a sexual release, which was transformed into anxiety. With this anxiety she was afraid that the shop assistant might repeat the assault, and she ran away.²¹

What is taking place here is a description of the eroticization or libidization of the original situation, an occurrence situated within the effect of deferred action. The original event is thus no longer the same as itself. The effect of the present on the past is to cause a repetition of the 'event' within which something new is taking place. What, however, is new? How is the new to be understood?

The temporal scheme here is central. The difficulty is the identification, or at least the suggested identification of sexuality with puberty, thereby effacing, though perhaps only in part, the later distinction drawn by Freud between the sexual and the genital. It is possible to go further and suggest that the theory of sexuality understood as a theory of gender construction would have meant that even the original event was not an origin, but itself already a translation. It will be necessary to explain why this is the case. In the subsequent discussion of the assault having an effect but not as it was experienced, Freud notes the following:

Here we have a case of the memory arousing an effect which it did not arouse as an experience because meantime the change [brought about] in puberty had made possible a different understanding of what was remembered. . . . Now this case is typical of repression in hysteria. We invariably find that a memory is repressed [*verdrängt*] which has only become a trauma by deferred action [*die nur nachträglichkeit zum Trauma geworden ist*].²²

Now while there may be terminological problems at play here, it is worth comparing this early passage, one incorporated according to the rubrics of the *Standard Edition* in the 'pre-psychoanalytic' writings, to a much later, perhaps even 'psychoanalytic,' passage:

it was no longer a question of the sexual experiences a particular individual had had in his childhood, but rather of his reaction to those experiences – of whether he had reacted to them by repression or not.²³

At stake in both instances is the reaction. The movement from the present to the past yielding a re-presentation. The change that takes place concerns the movement of re-presentation. The presence of this movement means that representation is not to be understood in terms of the disappearance and retrieval of images, but as given within a logic of repetition; here it takes place in terms of a re-presentation articulated within the logic of the again and the anew.

In his discussion of this section of the 'Project,' Laplanche draws the following important conclusions in regard to the operation of *Nachträglichkeit*, the 'theory of deferred action':

This theory postulates that nothing can be inscribed in the human unconscious except in relation to two events which are separated from one another in time by a moment of maturation that allows the subject to react in two ways to an initial experience or the memory of that experience. Freud describes the first moment in terms of fright [*Schreck*] or fright neurosis: the unprepared subject is confronted with a highly meaningful sexual action, but cannot take in its significance. If it remains latent, the memory is in itself neither pathogenic nor traumatic. It becomes pathogenic and traumatic when it is revived by a second scene which can be associated with it. But, because the subject can now react in a different way, it is the memory itself, and not the new scene, which functions as a source of traumatic or autotraumatic energy.²⁴

What is signaled in this passage is the complexity of the event. An initial occurrence which, because it cannot be incorporated, remains latent. A later occurrence causes the first to be reworked. It is now relived and thus can become what Laplanche describes as a 'source of traumatic or autotraumatic energy.' The reworking and reliving are the marks of repetition. What comes to be reworked, and thereby comes to be repeated, is an occurrence that generates the event of the co-presence of sameness and difference. In order that the event include difference, it is essential that it is the same occurrence that is repeated. (The same, here, because it includes memory and fantasy, means that the actual historical or empirical status of the event is not of logical significance though it may, in a given case, be of central psychological significance.) Repetition is therefore marked by the presence of the ineliminable necessity of difference. Reworking will always generate an origin or 'source' that is the same and different. One whose lack of unity in resisting synthesis will

therefore, and by its very nature, occasion analysis. *Nachträglichkeit*, in this instance, has a specific sense. It refers to the reworking of an occurrence by another such that the potential of the first is released and comes to form a complex event. It thereby accounts for the presence of an inscription into the unconscious. Occurrence, as Laplanche makes clear, can mean the experience, the memory of that experience, or even just a memory where the precise nature and hence reality of the occurrence is open to question. The 'source' identified by Laplanche is a complex event. It is the co-presence of sameness and difference. The immediate question that emerges here is how does the second occurrence occur? Is there no more than chance at play here?

In *Life and Death in Psychoanalysis* Laplanche notes in regard to Emma that 'there was . . . a seduction on the part of the little girl, since she returned to the shop, clearly in order to submit herself once again to the same type of gesture.'²⁵ He goes on to make a further suggestion that introduces an additional problematic element. Namely, it is possible that 'from the first [*dès la première fois*] she went to the shop moved [*mue*] by some obscure sexual premonition [*pressentiment*].'²⁶ The first occurrence is thereby removed from the realm of pure contingency. Contingency may pertain to the specificity of the occurrence, but not the nature and possibility of the occurrence itself. Laplanche's use of the expression '*dès la première fois*' can be interpreted as indicating that the possibility of the occurrence is, in a formal sense, already preordained. It is both true to say that Emma is in her situation, and that Emma is, in her situation. Contingency and necessity form Emma's situation. It is a situation, therefore, that is at the same time the one where she is found and the one in which she finds herself. Neither of these findings can ever be absolute, in fact, certain of them may be misplaced or misfound. Her situation, therefore, does not comprise a site where her destiny is final; moreover, it is not the site of mastery. The finality and the mastery in question refer to a control over the site as well as self-mastery; the later being the self in site. Emma can never be at one with her site - she can never have her self in sight - and never be at one with herself within it. Indeed, the self is always misplaced or misfound if it is thought to have itself in sight. Emma's situation, therefore, repeats the situation of the infant. Because this repetition places *Nachträglichkeit* within another situation, it comes to be provided with a greater extension. Prior to giving more content to this extension, a final, though nonetheless significant, aspect of these present concerns needs to be noted. Its significance lies in its forcing a reconsideration of any response to the question, what is an occurrence? The problem is knowing what it is that is occurring.

The need for this reconsideration stems from Laplanche's suggestion that Emma was actively involved in her own seduction.²⁷ The activity in question is not intentional, it is therefore not played out on the level of

consciousness. Its only conscious presence would be in terms of its own disavowal. What this involvement entails, however, is that each occurrence - the putative original singular event - brings with it something in addition to the occurrence itself. It is this addition that would seem to suggest that the occurrence is already a type of complex event. Furthermore, it is the 'something else,' when taken in conjunction with the occurrence, that allows for the occurrence to be inscribed within the logic of repetition. In other words, there could never have been a pure simple occurrence. What occurred formed part of a complex event. The complexity is, however, never an object for a subject. Part of what is at work within the event are those unconscious elements which, as has been noted, will allow the occurrence to be reworked. The radical consequence of this situation is that the original complex event, which was thought to be no more than an occurrence that comes to be repeated, is now to be understood as itself marked by its own irreducibility. It can never be at one with itself. What allows the occurrence to be repeated is its existence as a complex event. It is, of course, precisely this which allows a work to be translated. A translation does not unify a complex event, thereby rendering it singular or self-identical. Translation is only possible because of the complexity. The translation in its complexity will at the same time be a further complex event and a determinate object, one and the other. It has a twofold existence: not only are translation and interpretation linked, the source is in addition turned into a translation. It is this conclusion - one that enjoins repetition - that must be related to the work of *Nachträglichkeit*. There are therefore at least two reasons for trying to extend an understanding of the temporality of *Nachträglichkeit*. The first, as has already been suggested, concerns the importance of this concept within psychoanalysis itself. The second involves the formal link between *Nachträglichkeit* and repetition.

One of the references to which allusion has already been made is to Freud's claim, made in another letter to Fleiss, 9 June 1898, that in C. F. Meyer's short story 'Gustav Adolfs Page' there are two instances of this process, or to be more exact: 'In *Gustav Adolfs Page* finde ich den Gedanken der *Nachträglichkeit* zweimal.'²⁸ The action is represented in terms of thought or ideas, rather than as a process. This apparently problematic presentation needs to be pursued. The story involves deception by disguise, and even though it thereby forms part of a well-known genre, the story raises the larger and more general problem of the mask and therefore of the origin. Both representations of *Nachträglichkeit* within the story concern the realization, and its consequences, that things are not as they seem. Two discoveries occur. The first is that Christel, the page, was in fact a girl in boy's clothing. The second is that the tutor to the King's child was not a Protestant, but a Jesuit set on the task of the

child's secret conversion. Perhaps it should be added that both these eventualities were always possible. Deception, especially in the latter case, could never be completely precluded. Indeed, strenuous steps were taken on both sides of the divide – behind and in front of the disguise – in order that the façade of authenticity be maintained.

Why and how do these examples involve *Nachträglichkeit*? The immediate response concerns what was uncovered. It is not simply that the page and the tutor were discovered to be something other than they seemed. Furthermore, it is not simply that the kiss that revealed the boy to be a girl caused, but only in this instance, the seduction to fail. It is rather that the connections, the subsequent discoveries, turned the presentation of the tutor and the page – their being at the present – into contemporary sources of anxiety. In other words, they have been re-presented. Once again, the representation does not involve two different images, but a reworking such that the effect of the present on the past turns their occurrence – their existence as page and tutor – into that to which a traumatic response is possible. Due to the work of *Nachträglichkeit* there can be no return to what they had been and yet what there had been still lingers, inhering in what there now is. What now is is, on a formal level at least, the interplay of sameness and difference; an interplay marked by both irreducibility and dependence. There is a repetition – the tutor is still the tutor, etc. – but it is one in which something new has occurred. The enactment of the process cannot be represented as such, it can only be noted, hence 'den Gedanken der Nachträglichkeit.'

Understanding the temporality of *Nachträglichkeit* will turn on developing this particular conception of repetition. And yet because of the closure of any divide between repetition and reworking, this example will allow for the presentation of *Nachträglichkeit* in a more generalized form. The generality can be developed in relation, firstly, to Freud's description of the analyst as translator and, secondly, his construal of the conscious presentation as a translation. The striking question which arises here is what is it that would have to occur for translation not to be at work within psychoanalysis? In other words, could translation ever not figure within psychoanalysis?

The always already present presence of translation is evident, firstly, in Freud's description of the analyst as translator and then, secondly, when the presentation to consciousness, the process, and thus the conscious presentation are taken as translations. The problematic nature of these descriptions is clear from the fact that in the case of the conscious presentation there is no straightforward source text. The difficulties inherent in psychoanalysis's translation is succinctly captured in a passage from *An Autobiographical Study* in which Freud suggests that the manifest content of a dream is

a façade [*eine Fassade*] which would start as a starting point for the associations but not for the interpretation.²⁹

What, however, is a façade? The façade is not a deception. The covering or face need not feign. Neither need be a feint. Nevertheless, the dictate of convention is that the façade works to hide. It covers. The façade opens itself up to the effects of its own associations. The façade is linked to the mask, and both are related to the work of mimesis. Mimesis, the façade, and the mask are involved in the opposition between inside and outside. In all these links and interconnections – associations – there are a number of important questions. What takes place behind the mask? Is truth hidden behind the mask, concealed, waiting to be revealed? Furthermore, is the truth of the façade given when what is effaced can, finally, come to be faced? (It may be the case that holding back the sway of convention – an evitage of tradition's work – may unmask the mask beyond masking. Does the mask's redemption save by abandoning?)

A façade is a type of translation. The question posed above could have been posed with equal cogency and force in connection to a translation, even to a specific translation. In relation to the dream, what is known is that the work of condensation and displacement accounts, in part, for the form taken by the manifest content. Their work does not comprise either an origin or source. It is not what is, or has been, translated. Even in this short passage, Freud's use of the term 'façade' is given greater specification. The 'façade' is not, in itself, the object of interpretation. It only comes to figure within the construction of such an object when it is taken in relation to the association to which it will give rise. The object of interpretation becomes the interplay of the manifest content, the associations, and whatever other material that is provided by the analyst and which would have already been provided by the analysand. There is a curious temporality in the process of interpretation. It is a temporality marked by the play of tenses and constrained by the sequential rules of narrative, even though it is not reducible to them. Here is another instance of an irreducible figuring.

The starting-point, the translation, is reworked within the field of associations to which it gives rise. Each association does itself become the site of a further reworking. It must be added that there are associations which, potentially at least, are always to come. The future is to come and yet its projection can never be absolutely futural. (Once again, this is the problem of the singular event.) The future which is linked to the effect of the present on the past, a past that is present, thereby questioning the use of simple temporal divisions, is in addition implicated in the 'façade.' The 'façade,' in order that it be interpreted, must be reworked by another occurrence, an association, that takes place after it. The translation becomes translated. The translation is the source of its own subsequent

translation. The generalized effect of the movement from translation to translation means that the temporal process marked, perhaps named by, *Nachträglichkeit*, becomes the temporality of both analysis and interpretation. The move from 'façade' via association to interpretation is not from the past to the future. It is a movement articulated within the logic of the again and the anew.

In their *Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse* Laplanche and Pontalis, in the entry that deals with *Nachträglichkeit* ('Après Coup'), argue that it is not 'the lived [*le vécu*] in general' that is reworked, but that element which,

at the moment where it had been lived, had not been able to be integrated into a significant context [*un contexte significatif*].³⁰

While they go on to argue that the model for this movement is the 'traumatic event,' it is perhaps possible to suggest that the act of integration is a reworking and a repetition that characterizes the work of psychoanalysis itself. There are two preconditions which must be met in order that the 'façade' may come to have a 'significant context.' The first is the recognition that the façade does not mask its own truth and which, therefore, could be recovered by looking or searching back beyond or behind the façade. The second is that the context, in not being given in and of itself, can only be provided by an additional occurrence. In this instance, it is provided by the associations. It must be remembered that the associations stem from the façade. Repeated here, therefore, is the conclusion that was reached in the earlier discussion of the nature of the occurrence. The initial occurrence was not a singular event. It contained that which occasioned its repetition. The façade resists singularity in that its self-presentation always incorporates something in addition to itself.³¹ It is this addition which allows for the associations and thus reworking of the façade in the generation of the object of interpretation. This object is, as has been noted, the interrelationship between the 'façade,' the associations and other and future associations which will in turn generate the memory of other façades. One of the consequences of the role of memory is that it will complicate any attempt to establish an easy distinction between all subsequent associations and any future façades.

The 'façade' opens up a much larger area of philosophical inquiry. One that has only been approached in a halting way hitherto. The 'façade' puts in play the problem of the mask. From the 'larvatus prodeo' of Descartes³² to Kierkegaard's use of name as mask and Nietzsche's preoccupation with masking, the mask figures as a significant moment within philosophical reflection. The problem concerns the status of the masked. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche presents the stakes of masking thus: 'Whatever is profound loves masks: what is most profound even hates image and parable.'³³ It is these two levels of profundity that are of interest. What they raise is the question of how the mask is to be

understood. If the mask is understood as masking a reality, it becomes a surface, even a deceptive surface. The problem here is that a denial of this position, even one whose intention was the affirmation of the mask, may turn out to do no more than reduce the mask to a mere surface, a surface with no depth. The surface, therefore, would provide its own truth because there was only ever the work of surfaces. These two possibilities repeat the either/or of good and evil. They repeat it without addition. Moving from the purity of surface to the depth of truth engenders a self-confirming, though nonetheless nihilistic, oscillation. What emerges from Freud's façade is a way of construing the surface - the face that surfaces - beyond this oscillation. The first step is taking the façade as a translation, i.e., as a surface with depth.³⁴ The unmasking of masking reveals it to be a masked version of the problem of translation. The mask and the façade, because they both deny closure, reopen the stakes of the evaluation of translation. It has become an evaluation that is informed by translation itself.

In quoting Masson's translation of Freud's letter to Fleiss, it was noted that he translated 'heisst' as 'known.' How is this translation to be judged? The answer to this question lies in part in its own formulation. The question, as is the case with translation, both in terms of generality and specificity, involves the problematic relationship between judgment and epistemology. Perhaps one of the most precise expressions of classical epistemology is found in Descartes' claim, made in the *Discourse on Method*, that each 'thing' (*chose*) has a truth, and that once it is known, then that exhausts all that can be known about that 'thing.'³⁵ It is clear that this conception of the absolute nature of classical epistemology still figures in those positions which, while not skeptical about truth per se, see its realization as only an ideal. The implicit formulation of subject and object that is at work here needs to be expressed in terms of homology. What Descartes' position envisages is a homological relation between object and knowledge; a relation without residue or remainder. (It is on a formal level the same relation that occurs within the classical conception of the sign.) The viability of such a position depends upon the object being either self-identical or admitting of a finite and knowable set of delimitations. It is thus that their complete representation is envisaged as possible since they can be represented in their totality. Truth posed within the frame of classical epistemology is inextricably linked to the problematic of representation.

Translation, especially when it comes to be translated in order that the problem of the event can be seen to figure, resists any incorporation into classical epistemology. The temporality of *Nachträglichkeit*, a temporality whose extension incorporates interpretation, works outside the possibility of self-identity or epistemological exhaustion. The inscription of the futural in the complex event, of the potential for the future into the

present, forms one of the reasons why the event can never be self-identical. However, this does not militate against the existence of specific determinations, interpretations, translations, claims, etc. In other words, what cannot be precluded is the possibility of the pragma, for its presentation will always take in a present that can be dated. It is rather that the various forms of the pragma cannot be evaluated within the purview of classical epistemology. In the opening of homology, the heterological intrudes, but not as its opposite, a mere counter, but as the potential that was always present within the desire for homology. The heterological will demand a response that while taking the given as central – e.g. accepting the ‘façade’ as a point of departure – will occasion its evaluative dispersal by bringing conditions of possibility, associations, and consequences into play. Here the event sanctions the encounter between the transcendental, the interpretive, and the political as the site of judgment.

It is at this point – one presenting while masking a conclusion – that it may be possible to return to the initial failure of translation; i.e., the problem of squaring ‘a failure of translation’ and ‘un refusement de traduction.’ The original ‘Versagung’ is neither failed, if it is translated as ‘un refusement,’ nor moreover is its force refused, if it is translated by ‘failure.’ The difference between the two is twofold. In the first place, it resides, as has already been indicated, in the different consequences that each demand and the different associations to which they give rise. The consequences will serve as part of what is at stake in the critical judgment of any translation. In the second place, the difference resides in ‘Versagung’; in the word ‘Versagung’ as marking a complex event. If this is the case, then it can be concluded that the word, as a complex event, will always be that which contains the potential – be it actualized or not – for what can be called semantic differential plurality. Any attempt to fix a meaning, translation, interpretation by its inscription into homology and classical epistemology will always fail, for what can never be precluded is the futural possibility – a possibility that defines by opening up the future – for a different site of translation, etc. It is, of course, a possibility already inscribed in the present, at the present. The future as becoming enacts an operative and effective relationship between the past and the present. The life of the work involves, as Walter Benjamin argues, its afterlife. The same is true, but differently, for the event.

NOTES

- 1 This paper takes up and continues an analysis of the interplay between psychoanalysis, philosophy and translation that was begun in *Translation and the Nature of Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989). See in particular chapter 5.

- 2 It is interesting to note James Strachey’s footnote in the *Standard Edition (SE)* that accompanies the reference to *Nachträglichkeit* in ‘A Project for a Scientific Psychology’: ‘The whole idea had the ground cut from under it by the discovery a year or two later of infantile sexuality and the recognition of the persistence of unconscious instinctual impulses’ (*SE*, 1: 356). The problem here is what is meant by the expression ‘whole idea.’ Not only is it clear that *Nachträglichkeit* plays a fundamental role in the analysis of the Wolf Man (indeed, its importance is in fact conceded by Strachey), it is also the case that the temporality it engenders forms a constitutive part of the work of psychoanalysis. *Nachträglichkeit* is open to its own translation.
- 3 Sigmund Freud, *Aus den Anfängen der Psychoanalyse* (London: Imago, 1950), p. 187. The full context is the following: ‘Die Versagung der Übersetzung, das ist das, was klinisch “Verdrängung” heisst. Motiv derselben ist stets eine Unlustentbindung, die durch Übersetzung entstehen würde, als ob diese Unlust eine Denkstörung hervorriefe, die die Übersetzungsarbeit nicht gestattet.’ The inverted commas placed around *Verdrängung* must be noted. Their most immediate effect is to put into question any automatic commensurability between ‘Verdrängung’ and *Verdrängung*. The relation is therefore one to be negotiated. The negotiation will, however, always defer to the future. The deference will not preclude the necessity of the present. What would it mean to obviate presence? Indeed, it is this necessity of the present and presentation that will come to be articulated in terms of the ‘pragma.’ See the reference in note 9.
- 4 *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887–1904*, ed. and trans. Jeffrey M. Masson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 208.
- 5 In *Psychanalyse à l’université*, 51 (1988): 405. In his recent work, Laplanche has made use of translation in order to develop his own ‘foundations’ for psychoanalysis. See *New Foundations for Psychoanalysis*, trans. David Macey (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989) and ‘Temporalité et traduction: Pour une remise au travail de la philosophie du temps,’ *Psychanalyse à l’université*, 53 (1989): 17–35. In addition, he is general editor of the new French translation of Freud’s complete works. Some of the difficulties involved in this undertaking and his ‘Terminologique Raisonnée’ can be found in André Bourguignon, Pierre Cotet, Jean Laplanche, and François Robert, *Traduire Freud* (Paris: PUF, 1989). It will be clear from the following that considerable importance has been attached to Laplanche’s work. A number of his formulations have been adopted. I offer a more sustained reading of Laplanche in ‘Laplanche and the Translation of Time,’ in *Laplanche and Psychoanalysis*, ed. John Fletcher and Martin Stanton (forthcoming).
- 6 One of the intriguing issues to which this neologism gives rise is the value of etymology. ‘Le refusement’ can be most easily derived from the verb ‘refuser.’ The verb, however, does not have a straightforward etymology, indeed, it is thought to have arisen out of a confusion between two Latin verbs ‘recusare’ and ‘refutare’; the ‘t’ finally being elided. The irony is that ‘refutare’ is semantically, as opposed to etymologically, close to ‘refouler.’ ‘Refoulement’ is the term normally used to translate ‘Verdrängung.’ The value of etymology is therefore yet to be fixed.
- 7 François Roustang, *Psychoanalysis Never Lets Go*, trans. Ned Lukacher (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 17.
- 8 Masson, *Letters of Freud to Fliess*, p. 316.
- 9 I have tried to develop the idea of the ‘pragma’ in *Translation and the Nature of Philosophy*. See in particular pp. 148–9. The significant aspect of the

- pragma is that it allows for specificity while at the same time refusing the necessity of a homological relation - a relation of commensurability or identity - between, for example, the object of interpretation and a specific interpretation, the source text and its translation. Furthermore, the co-presence of both the pragma and the complex event means that it is possible to think being within becoming; one within the other and therefore of a determinate being within becoming. This co-presence means a reworking of the nature of becoming. The presence of one, therefore, neither negates the presence of the other, nor entails its necessary absence.
- 10 It is this possibility, namely the identity between positing and being, that is fundamental to Fichte's approach in the *Wissenschaftslehre*. His formulation, while limited to the self ('Ich'), is as follows: 'Sich selbst setzen und Seyn sind, vom Ich gebraucht, völlig gleich' ('To posit oneself and to be are, when related to the self, completely identical'). *Fichtes Werke* vol. 1 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971), p. 98. It is precisely the tenuous nature of this connection and its link to Fichte's own formulation of the principle of identity that form the basis of Novalis' critique of Fichte in his *Fichte Studien*. I hope to treat this critique in greater detail elsewhere.
 - 11 Here the attempt to avoid a risk is by its very nature already a risk.
 - 12 For a more detailed discussion of differential ontology and the anoriginal, see my *Art, Mimesis and the Avant-Garde* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), in particular chapters 1 and 2.
 - 13 Heidegger's precise formulation is: 'To think Being without beings means to think Being without regard to metaphysics [ohne Rücksicht auf die Metaphysik] *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969). While Heidegger goes on to note the difficulties attached to this project, such that the project becomes the attempt to leave metaphysics to its own concerns and thereby think Being 'without regard,' it remains the case that the conditions of possibility for this undertaking are those which pertain to the possibility of the singular event. This is, of course, only to begin a reading of the 'ohne Rücksicht.'
 - 14 Jean Laplanche and Jean-Baptiste Pontalis, *Fantasma originnaire. Fantômes des origines. Origines du fantasme* (Paris: Hachette, 1985), p. 45.
 - 15 This paper became the first chapter of the *Studies on Hysteria* (SE, 11).
 - 16 SE, 11: 221.
 - 17 The problem posed by the formation of symbols has been analysed in greater detail in *Translation and the Nature of Philosophy*, pp. 120-3.
 - 18 Masson, *Letters of Freud to Fliess*, p. 264.
 - 19 SE, 7: 232.
 - 20 Laplanche and Pontalis, *Fantasma originnaire*, particularly pp. 65-74.
 - 21 SE, 2: 353.
 - 22 SE, 1: 354. The German text is found in Freud, *Aus den Anfängen der Psychoanalyse*.
 - 23 SE, 7: 276-7.
 - 24 Jean Laplanche, *New Foundations for Psychoanalysis*, p. 112.
 - 25 Jean Laplanche, *Vie et Mort en Psychanalyse* (Paris: Flammarion, 1970), p. 65.
 - 26 *Ibid.*, p. 65.
 - 27 These conclusions are drawn from Laplanche's acute observations. They are not the conclusions that he has drawn himself.
 - 28 The German text is found in Freud, *Aus den Anfängen der Psychoanalyse*. An English translation is 'In "Gustav Adolph's Page" I found the idea of deferred action twice.'
 - 29 SE, 20: 29.
 - 30 Jean Laplanche and Jean-Baptiste Pontalis, *Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse* (Paris: PUF, 1967), p. 34.
 - 31 Another way of pursuing the presence of what here has been called the 'something else' is via Jean-Jacques Lecercle's theory of the remainder. See his *The Violence of Language* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 61-95.
 - 32 For an important analysis of masking in Descartes, see Jean-Luc Nancy, *Ego Sum* (Paris: Flammarion, 1979), pp. 61-95.
 - 33 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1966), section 40. The role of the mask and of masking in Nietzsche's work is far more detailed than has been indicated here. Nonetheless, its importance lies in its attempt to unmask masking. See, for example, section 25 of *Beyond Good and Evil*.
 - 34 There is an important analogue here with the interpretation of paintings. It emerges to the extent that the canvas as surface is posited as having its truth at a depth within it. Again, the countermove is not the celebration of surface. I have tried to develop a conception of the event as involving surfaces with depth in relation to the paintings of Jackson Pollock, in 'Events with Depth: Jackson Pollock's Action Paintings,' *Art and Design*, 11-12 (1989): 30-5.
 - 35 Descartes presents this argument in the Second Part of the *Discourse on Method*. While it is perhaps an elementary formulation, it still captures the aspirations of classical epistemology.